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 Opinion research in major capitalist democracies has identified one of the key elements 
of legitimacy of the capitalist economic order in public opinion: popular adherence to the norms 
and beliefs that justify economic inequality. Popular commitment to those norms and beliefs in a 
society, scholars have suggested, buttresses the legitimacy of capitalism in Western society. In 
Korea, however, such favorable norms and beliefs regarding inequality have never been 
popularly accredited; even when Korea was achieving a respectable capitalist growth with a 
relatively moderate level of income inequality, unfavorable perceptions and norms of inequality 
prevailed in public opinion. Given the manifest discrepancy between the general attitudes and 
beliefs about inequality in Western capitalist countries and those in Korea, this research 
examined the Korean public’s beliefs about economic inequality from both cross national and 
domestic perspectives, using data from the 1999 and 2003 ISSP surveys on Social Inequality. 
 From a cross national comparison for which Korea was compared to nineteen OECD 
nations, the following features of the Korean public’s beliefs about inequality were diagnosed. 
First, popular beliefs about large income differences in Korea, as contrasted with varying income 
inequality indices of other OECD countries, were unduly inflated; second, Koreans’ perceived 
injustice of the income distribution in the society, as measured by the justice gap, was relatively 
high; and, third, Koreans’ tolerance for unequal, if not unjust, distribution was relatively weak, 
given the small difference in the justice gap between people who perceived income differences in 
their society as too large and those who did not. 
 With the evidence of unfavorable public perceptions and norms of inequality in Korea, 
the two main theoretical frames of social justice study, the ideology thesis and the structural 
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position thesis, were introduced to better understand Koreans’ unfavorable views of income 
inequality. The key premise of the ideology thesis is that the subjective perception of inequality 
may have less to do with objective social facts, but more with value systems or ideologies 
regarding social justice. In this regard, the two most germane distributive justice ideologies, 
egalitarian (the EDJI) and meritocratic (the MDJI) justice ideologies, were measured across 
countries. In terms of the strength of the EDJI, popular support for the EDJI was found much 
higher in Korea than in most other OECD countries. The homogeneity of the EDJI was also 
relatively high in Korea, indicating the presence of popular consensus on the legitimacy of the 
EDJI. Interestingly, only in Korea and Spain, the strength of the EDJI exceeded that of the MDJI, 
which defined the EDJI as the primary and the MDJI as the secondary distributive justice 
ideologies of Korea. 
 Using a logistic regression, along with a few key socio-demographic factors and the 
justice gap, the ideological impact of the two distributive norms on Koreans’ perceptions of 
income inequality was analyzed. The influence of the EDJI was dominant. With all predictors in 
the model, the EDJI was most influential in crafting Koreans’ unfavorable perceptions of large 
income differences. Analysis also confirmed the impact of the perceived injustice on people’s 
tolerance of income inequality, where a high level of perceived injustice increased the odds of 
perceiving large income differences. The meaningful outcomes related to the EDJI and the 
justice gap, thus, supported the importance of justice value scheme, as proposed by the ideology 
thesis, in shaping people’s perceptions of inequality in Korea. 
 In relation to the structural thesis, following its key premise that people’s self-interest 
calculation based on their socio-economic positions systematically distorts their perceptions of 
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inequality in reality, the impact of people’s mobility experiences and their justness evaluation of 
them on perceptions of income inequality was analyzed. Analysis found that individual mobility 
experience, when operationalized in terms of direction, degree, and current social status, made a 
clear difference in people’s perceptions of income differences: the greater the degree of an 
upward mobility and the higher the self-identified current social status, the more tolerance of 
income inequality by conceiving of current income differences in the society as not conspicuous. 
Analysis also showed the relevance of justness evaluation of mobility experience at a personal 
level to perceptions of income inequality. For those whose justness evaluation of mobility 
experience was positively identified, i.e., getting over compensated for the achievement of 
mobility, income inequality was more tolerated as they conceived of current income differences 
in Korean society as not conspicuous. This finding, interestingly, revealed Koreans’ 
contradictory reward justice scheme and its application, to the extent that when the injustice of 
over-reward, as measured by the justice gap, occurred at a society level, people’s discontent 
facilitated a very unfavorable appraisal of income differences in the society, but when the same 
injustice of over-reward occurred to oneself, such injustice rather facilitated a very favorable 
appraisal of income differences in the society. The two contrasting outcomes of the justice 
evaluations, despite they all derive from the same reward justice scheme of the individual, 
exemplified how people’s self-interest calculations, as the structural position thesis argued, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. PROLOGUE   
 With growing emphasis on lay views of economic justice, the social distribution of public 
norms of and beliefs about economic inequality has become an important theme of social justice 
research. By means of either lavatory experiments involving small groups or sample surveys 
involving a sizable population, political scientists and sociologists have investigated how and on 
what basis the common person perceives economic inequality and evaluates its justice.  
The majority of research on this topic, fruitful as it is, nonetheless, has been confined 
predominantly to citizens in the advanced Western capitalist nations, typically, the United States 
and Great Britain (e.g., Feagin 1975; Jowell and Airey 1984; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Ladd and 
Bowman 1998; Lane 1959; Lane 1962; Lane 1986; McClosky and Zaller 1984b; Park et al. 2003; 
Potter 1954; Rainwater 1974b; Shapiro and Young 1989; Witherspoon and Jowell 1985), and 
little attention has been paid to non-Western contexts
1
. It was not until the revolutions of 1989 in 
Central and Eastern Europe that scholars began to leave their conventional parochialism behind, 
turned their attention to areas outside of the Western capitalist democracies, and focused on post-
communist countries (e.g., Denisovsky, Kozyreva and Matskovsky 1993; Duch 1993; Kluegel 
and Mason 2004; Mason 1995; Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1993; Willerton and Sigelman 1993). 
A subsequent comparative analysis of citizens of the two regimes revealed not only that 
there are crucial differences in public perceptions of the justice of inequality, but also that there 
is astonishing congruence between lay views on the justice of inequality and the respective 
                                                 
1
 According to Kluegel et al. (1995), apart from scholarly parochialism, practical and technological issues such as 
the lack of effective interpersonal communication means between scholars, resource procurements, and standardized 
research procedures posted an obstacle to broadening the research scope.      
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functioning of both types of regimes (e.g., Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1995; Kluegel, Mason 
and Wegener 1999; Marshall et al. 1999; Wegener and Liebig 1995a; Wegener and Liebig 
1995b). That is, research found that citizens in advanced Western societies endorse the 
inegalitarian criteria of earned desert over the egalitarian criteria of equality and need, admit the 
legitimacy of inequality by tolerating a greater range of inequality in reality, and take a more 
favorable view of the wealthy by seeing the wealthy as deserving of their status, whereas citizens 
in the post-communist societies favor more egalitarian distributive norms, support state invention 
to minimize social inequality, and take a more negative, and even hostile, view of the wealthy by 
seeing their wealth as the result of social dysfunction.  
Given the stark contrast in popular norms of and beliefs about the justice of inequality 
between capitalist and former communist societies, some scholars have argued that in all 
advanced capitalist societies people would share more or less the same norms and beliefs 
regarding inequality. That is, in advanced capitalist societies, citizens would prefer perceiving 
and tolerating economic inequality as necessary and just because of prevailing self-interest and 
individualistic ideology. According to their rationale, once confronted with the greater 
advantages that a market system can offer to a society and its members, all rational individuals 
cannot but hold favorable views of inequality, not to mention a market system in general. 
However, such a bold assumption concerning the favorable norms of and beliefs about 
inequality in capitalist societies would have been less probable if the research had set forth 
different national settings for analysis. That is, when a group of societies that represent typical 
Western capitalism are contrasted with those that represent typical communist socialism, the 
resulting findings are more likely to reflect ‘between’ group differences rather than ‘within’ 
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group differences. As is generally known, the two regimes, until the revolution of 1989, had long 
been separated from each other and had moved toward the opposite ends of the economic and 
political spectra, namely, capitalism versus communism and democracy versus socialism. 
Accordingly, to a certain degree, for citizens of the two regimes to show evidence of a stark 
contrast in their norms of and beliefs about inequality may be a natural consequence, if not a 
foregone conclusion. 
It thus follows that the congruence between popular norms of and beliefs about inequality 
and the functioning of each type of society may have been all the more probable due to the initial 
research frame set forth. The crucial question is whether such congruence can still stand when 
we divert our research scope from the two extremes, i.e., typical capitalist democracies in the 
West and post-communist socialists in Eastern and Central Europe, to the middle ground. In 
other words, will citizens of non-Western capitalist societies endorse the same favorable norms 
of and beliefs about inequality as their western counterparts do? 
1.2. ELABORATION 
 Economic inequality is now a marked feature of the socio-economic structure of capitalist 
societies. Income and asset stratifications stand out, and division between the winners and the 
losers in the market has become more manifest than ever. According to Frank and Cook (1995), 
as people have vied for even fewer and bigger prizes in the market, more economic waste, 
inequality, and impoverished cultural life have been brought to a majority in society while the 




However, opinion research in the West has revealed rather favorable public attitudes 
toward inequality. That is, citizens in advanced capitalist nations in general view inequality as 
just and legitimate, and they principally concede its necessity for the greater social good. In 
America, for instance, people have been found to support merit-based unequal distributions over 
equality, and stigmatize the poor for their plight, attributing their poverty to their moral defects 
such as incompetence and laziness (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1959; Lane 1962; Lane 1986; 
McClosky and Zaller 1984a; Williamson 1974b; Williamson 1974c; Williamson 1976). 
According to Lane (1986), such positive attitudes toward the capitalist socioeconomic 
order in America is rooted in Americans’ fundamental commitment to market justice. Market 
justice, by definition, is an inter-related system of norms of and beliefs about the economic order 
that serves to legitimize capitalism. Lane highlighted that Americans value earned deserts as a 
critical market justice norm over other values such as equality and need because they judge 
fairness in the economic domain in terms of the process of allocation, not the shape of outcomes 
per se. Put differently, in their assessment of market fairness, Americans in general are 
concerned not so much about macro (or social) justice, namely, the outcome of social 
distribution as a whole, as about micro (or individual) justice, namely, the equity of individual 
reward. Rainwater (1974a), likewise, discovered a similar justice orientation in his study. He said: 
A few respondents offered this [everyone should have about the same level of 
resources] as their understanding of the American equality value. When they did 
so, it was often more to disagree with it than to endorse it. In general, the idea of 
essentially equal distribution of resources does not seem to be attractive to most 
people. (P. 168) 
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The defense of capitalism, namely, the principal commitment to market justice norms and 
beliefs, according to Lane, is not unique to the American public. He argued for its universal 
application to other capitalist societies as well: he argued that any rational human being would 
accept unequal distribution due to market processes as more just than distribution based on 
political justice, namely equality and need, because of the genius of the market. That is, the 
market, unlike politics, creates the sense of controlling one’s own destiny for people, and this 
leads them to sense more injustice in the polity than injustice in the market. Therefore, 
preference for market justice over political justice is a universal psychological reaction that any 
rational person can experience. In the same vein, Della Fave (1980; 1986a; 1986b; 1991) argued 
for the common legitimation process of social stratification in capitalist societies. According to 
him, in capitalist societies, the wealthy come to be seen as deserving of their privilege through a 
process of status attribution. By self-comparison to the wealthy, the poor subsequently come to 
see their own status as equitable as well. According to Lerner (1980), people are fundamentally 
motivated to believe that they live in a just world where people get what they deserve. Such 
beliefs, also known as the Just World Hypothesis, he argued, illusory as they may be, lead people 
to convince themselves that beneficiaries inevitably deserve their benefits and victims their 
suffering.  
As the foregoing theories suggest, if citizens in the capitalist countries indeed share a 
great cognitive commonality in the way they accept inequality as desirable, prefer earned deserts 
over equality and need, and justify the privileges of the wealthy as deserved, then it is fair to 
speculate that Koreans’ beliefs about and norms of inequality will not differ from their Western 
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counterparts’. Late-comer capitalist state as it may be, at least before the 1997 crisis2, Korea was 
renowned as a model case of miraculous capitalist development (Berger and Hsiao 1988; Jochim 
1992; Kahn 1979; Lodge and Vogel 1987; Tu 1996; Vogel 1991). It was miraculous in that not 
only was a successful and rapid capitalist adjustment achieved following the devastation of the 
Korean War in the 1950s, but also such rapid industrialization was achieved in the absence of 
serious economic inequality. Such a dual achievement of Korea—namely, rapid economic 
expansion and an equal distribution of income—as the World Bank acknowledged (1993), was 
an exceptional experience for a developing country. The following figures support this point. 
According to Figures 1 and 2, not only did the GNI per capita increase by nearly seven times, 
from $1,645 in 1980 to $12,197 in 1996, but also both the GDP and GNI increased significantly 
each year, growing by averages of 7.76% and 7.99% per year, respectively. More importantly, 
this expansion of the macro-economy was not accompanied by a constant increase in income 
inequality. Instead, as Figure 3 indicates, Korea’s Gini coefficient during the same period 
revealed an overall declining pattern. Looking at the changes between 1982 and 1997, except for 
during the first half of the 1980s, when the coefficient rose slightly from .307 in 1980 to .312 in 
1985, the coefficient constantly declined over the following years and dipped to a low of .281 in 
1993. While this downturn was shortly interrupted by a slight increase over the following three 
years, .284 in 1994 and 1995, and .291 in 1996, the coefficient again dipped to a low of .283 in 
1997.  
                                                 
2
 Faced with a currency crisis in November 1997, Korea asked assistance from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). On 3 December, the authorities and IMF agreed on a program amounting to $57 billion, the largest in IMF’s 
history. The program required a tight macroeconomic policy as well as comprehensive structural adjustment in the 
corporate and financial sectors.  
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Behind the successful and swift capitalist adaptation of Korea, one is tempted to assume, 
lie corresponding favorable norms of and beliefs about inequality in public opinion such as the 
preference for earned deserts over equality, a high level of perceived legitimacy of economic 
system, and the legitimation of economic inequality as in the West. However, early literature on 
Korea written by Western scholars provides different perspectives on this subject matter. The 
Korean public, according to their notes, was vastly concerned about and critical of economic 
inequality even when the Korean economy was renowned for keeping economic inequality under 
control as it did in the 1980s, not to mention when the Korean economy fell into the mire after 
the 1997 financial crisis, and, more importantly, such public anxiety easily was transformed into 
social hostility toward the wealthy. 
Leipziger et al. (1992), for instance, in their analysis of income and wealth distribution of 
Korea in the late 1980s, alluded to the presence of widespread public concern about inequality 
and the wealthy. They said 
The homogeneous and generally classless nature perhaps makes the population 
more conscious of differences in living standards and more concerned about 
inequality. This concern is typically expressed in terms of the overall spread of 
living standards and the similarity of treatment of people in similar initial 
circumstances. There is clearly widespread resentment at vertical inequality 
directed not so much at the hardship of the poor, but at the privileges of the rich… 
rapid economic growth and improvements in average living standards go a long 
way toward keeping such feelings in check. But if growth declines for any 
8 
 
appreciable length of time, popular resentment may well be expressed more 
forcefully. (P. 104) 
Similarly, Brandt (1987), in discussing the growing dissatisfaction and aggression of the Korean 
workers during the 1980s, noted that  
The issue of equality of result is of critical ideological importance, even though 
the overall distribution of wealth in South Korea appears to be relatively equitable 
in comparison to that in most countries… it is widely perceived as unjust… 
Unlike the traditional period when it was appropriate for hierarchical social 
differences to be reflected in property and living standards, the inequalities of 
today are seen as evidence of a lack of just rule. (P. 226) 
Nelson (2000) also documented agitated public attitudes toward the wealthy in the aftermath of 
the 1997 crisis. She claimed that responding to the social and economic dislocations of the post-
IMF period offered an opportunity for South Koreans to face the reality of differences within the 
nation. She said     
The demonstration of differences through the possession of goods has not only 
undermined the story of national unity, but also created rifts not just between the 
wealthy and the poor but within the comfortable classes themselves as new forms 
of wealth generate new networks, new practices, new values, new styles, and 
between generations and genders. (P. 184) 
This trend, she claimed, bolstered public condemnation of the wealthy for their extravagance, 
waste, and indulgence. In particular, the Chaebol, the South Korean form of business 
conglomerates, was targeted with sharp criticism, and Chaebol owners were blamed for their 
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poor judgment, corruption, and the blind pursuit of individual enrichment at the cost of the 
nation’s solvency. 
Indeed, the 1997 financial crisis put the Korean economy in the grip of a severe 
depression. Not only did negative economic growth follow immediately, but also the GNI per 
capita plunged into a low of $7,355 in 1998 from $12,197 in 1996. It was not until 2003 that the 
GNI per capita recovered its pre-crisis level of 1996. Apparently, the long-lasting economic 
recession exacerbated economic inequality as well. As shown in the Figure 3, the Gini 
coefficient rose to .316 in 1998 from .283 in 1997, and it was only after 2002 that the coefficient 
started to decline. Therefore, it is apparent that the overall economic conditions of Korea in the 
aftermath of the crisis were unfavorable. Both growing income inequality and sudden declines in 
the overall living standards must have doubled the economic burdens Koreans had to embrace, 
and this in turn must have amplified the feelings of deprivation and resentment among the 
Korean public. In this light, the heightened public consciousness of economic inequality as a 
critical social issue may be attributable to the 1997 economic crisis and its aftermath. On this 
regard, Ku (2006) argued that it was not until the 1997 economic crisis that the notion of 
economic inequality or poverty began to surface as a crucial social issue in Korea. Before the 
crisis, he argued, such notions gained relatively little, if any, public attention, since continuing 
economic growth and improvements in average living standards as a whole went a long way 
toward keeping such attention in check. Even if people came to admit that some of their fellow 
citizens suffered economic inequality, its magnitude was underestimated, if not ignored, since it 
was seen as exceptional, or true only of minorities in society. However, a series of economic 
hardships in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, e.g., mass unemployment, sharp reduction in real 
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income, and rapid increase in the poor class, clearly brought about widespread public resentment 
at vertical inequality.  
Nevertheless, it is vital not to overstate, like in Ku’s claim, the psychological impact of 
the post-crisis economy on the Korean public’s opinions about economic inequality because, as 
documented in the earlier observation of the Korean public, the popular concerns about large 
economic inequality, the social stigmatization of the wealthy, and the popular beliefs about 
distributive injustice as such were not unknown before the crisis; they were also prevalent even 
when economic inequality did not pose any serious threat to Korean society. Therefore, the 
critical ways Koreans perceive and evaluate economic inequality in reality may not be construed 
as an occasional phenomenon, but a recurring social phenomenon and practice.   
As far as the foregoing features are concerned, popular views of inequality in Korea do 
not seem to be congruous with those of Western capitalist societies in general; on the contrary, 
widespread public disapproval of inequality and the wealthy in Korea rather resonate with the 
popular justice sentiments in post-communist Europe in the early transition period wherein many 
citizens did not fling off deep-rooted socialist values and saw emerging economic inequality and 
social stratification as the product of social dysfunction, namely, social injustice. It is important 
to note, however, that Korea, unlike post-communist European countries, did not navigate the 
transition from state socialism to capitalism during its capitalist developmental process. Hence, 
there was no heritage of socialist justice beliefs and norms to abandon before adopting market 
justice norms and beliefs.  
Therefore, studying the Korean public’s beliefs about and norms of economic inequality 
will have important implications for researchers interested in the relationship between popular 
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norms of and beliefs about inequality and institutional characteristics of society in which they are 
rooted. It will provide us with opportunities not only to test the validity of speculation on popular 
adherence to market justice norms and beliefs in developed capitalist societies in general, but 
also to expand knowledge of the social distribution of public norms of and beliefs about 
inequality in a non-Western capitalist society.  
For Korean studies, this research also has an important implication. In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, the dampening of steady economic growth and the global decline of living 
standards have aggravated Koreans’ frustrations with existing economic order and its fairness, 
and such public sentiments has opened up a welfare war, as it goes now, a heated controversy 
over welfare expansion. Major parties’ outbidding each other with more generous welfare 
spending proposals, however, as the Wall street journal warned recently (2012), is an 
unaffordable economic populism to buy more voter affections by capitalizing on widespread 
public insecurity at the expense of the country’s destiny to fall into a welfare trap and fiscal crisis. 
As such, public concerns about inequality of Korea today have reached a critical point to catapult 
the country into a welfare trap which the Korean economy cannot even afford. However, 
sufficient investigation into issues related to the Korean views of inequality and justice has not 
been carried out as if such public concerns are a legitimate response to the growing instability of 
the Korean economy since the crisis. Even the media’s unstinting criticism of the growing 
inequality enhances public concerns. Therefore, as much as the growing inequality of recent 
years is deemed as a social problem, the excessive public response to it should be deemed as 
another social problem. Yet, the latter has not been properly addressed in Korean study, 
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especially with reference to the major theories and perspectives on the lay norms and beliefs 
about inequality. My research, therefore, aims to bridge this research gap for Korean study. 
Given the significance o manifest discrepancy between the general norms of and beliefs 
about inequality in conventional Western capitalist societies and those in Korea, my research 
proposes to explore the Korean views of inequality.  
1.3. PLAN OF THE RESEARCH  
 My research serves two major purposes: to diagnose and to explain the central features of 
Koreans’ views of economic inequality. Chapter 2 offers the diagnosis of Koreans’ perceptions 
of inequality. One of the most puzzling and intriguing Korean perceptions of inequality is that 
there has always been a heightened public awareness of large income differences in the society. 
Contrary to popular belief, however, economic distribution in Korea, especially income-wise, 
has been more equitable than in other industrialized countries. The incongruence between 
popular awareness of and the reality of economic inequality of Korea, therefore, stands as a 
puzzle. To better assess how this incongruence in Korea stands out, I use the 1999/2003 ISSP 
survey data on Social Inequality, and compare the Korean public’s perceptions of income 
differences to those of other OECD countries. From this cross national comparison, I discuss 
whether, and, if so, to what extent the Korean public’s belief about large income inequality 
deviates from its reality, relative to other OECD counterparts. I also examine the Korean public’s 
perceived injustice of income distribution in the society and tolerance for unequal, if not unjust, 
distribution in a comparative perspective by using the concept of the justice gap. By highlighting 
how much distributive injustice Koreans perceive in the current income distribution and how 
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intolerant Koreans are of unequal, if not unjust, distribution, I suggest that an inflated public 
awareness of large income differences in Korea, illusory as it may be, is all the more possible.    
In Chapters 3 and 4, the focus changes from diagnosis to explanation. To this end, the 
two main theoretical frames of social justice study, the ideology thesis and the structural position 
thesis, are introduced to better understand Korean people’s unfavorable views of large income 
inequality. The key premise of the ideology thesis is that the subjective perception of inequality 
may have less to do with objective social facts, but more with value systems or ideologies 
regarding social justice. In this regard, the two most germane distributive justice ideologies, 
egalitarian and meritocratic justice ideologies, are discussed. Based on the ideology thesis, 
Chapter 3 analyzes, first, the popular distributive justice ideologies of Korea by using the ISSP 
surveys, and compares the strengths of the two distributive ideologies from cross-national and 
domestic perspectives. After defining the primary and secondary distributive justice norms of 
Korea, I use a logistic regression analysis, and examine the extent to which these ideological 
predictors, in light of the ideology thesis, craft Korean people’s views of income differences.   
Chapter 4 turns to the structural position thesis. The key premise of this thesis is that 
people’s self-interest calculation based on their socio-economic positions in the hierarchy 
systematically distorts their perceptions of inequality in reality. For analysis, I focus on people’s 
mobility experiences and justness evaluation of them, and analyze how these two predictors, in 
light of the structural thesis, craft Korean people’s views of income differences. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the general findings of the Korean views of inequality, 
and brings together a discussion of the underlying implications that these findings have for 
Korean society.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE KOREAN PUBLIC’S BELIEFS ABOUT ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY  
 What do Koreans believe about disparities in the distribution of economic resources in 
the society? Do they believe that inequality among individuals and groups within society is 
severe or equitable? More importantly, are such popular beliefs about inequality in accordance 
with the distributive reality of Korea? As social psychologists have often noted, our knowledge 
and perception of reality is far from complete. Incomplete as it may be, such perception is more 
influential than reality itself since the former serves as a basis for inferring other information and 
action. Therefore, it is important to explore what people believe about economic inequality and 
the extent to which such popular beliefs deviate from the economic reality of Korea. 
One of the most puzzling and intriguing Korean perceptions of inequality is that there has 
been a heightened public awareness of large income differences in the society. Contrary to 
popular belief, however, economic distribution in Korea, especially income-wise, has been more 
equitable than in other industrialized countries. The incongruence between popular awareness of 
and the reality of economic inequality of Korea, therefore, stands as a critical puzzle. To better 
assess how this incongruence in Korea stands out, I use the 1999/2003 ISSP survey data on 
Social Inequality, and compare the Korean public’s perceptions of income differences to those of 
other OECD countries. From this cross national comparison, I discuss whether, and, if so, to 
what extent the Korean public’s belief about inequality belies reality, relative to other OECD 
counterparts. I also examine the Korean public’s perceived injustice of income distribution in a 
society and tolerance for unequal, or unjust, distribution in a comparative perspective by using 
the concept of the justice gap. By highlighting how much distributive injustice Koreans perceive 
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in the current income distribution and how intolerant Koreans are of unequal, if not unjust, 
distribution, I suggest that an inflated public awareness of large income differences in Korea, 
illusory as it may be, is all the more possible.    
2.1. KOREANS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION: HOW 
UNEQUAL IS KOREA? 
 Opinion research (Hwang 1992; Kim et al. 2006; Sok 1997; Sok 2005a) has shown that 
public beliefs about inequality have been prevalent in Korea. In the 1990 national survey, for 
instance, 80.4% of the respondents answered that the law was unequally administered. As for job 
and promotion opportunities, 73.5% and 80.7% of the respondents, respectively, answered that 
they were unequally distributed. As for the gender equality of women, 67.3% of the respondents 
answered that females were unequally treated. Over 88% of the respondents agreed that income 
and asset distribution of Korea was unequal (see Figure 4). 
When respondents were grouped by their social-economic status, awareness of economic 
inequality varied little between groups. In Figure 5, for instance, respondents were grouped by 
their subjective social status and cross-tabulated with awareness of inequality. The result was 
that, regardless of their social status, over 80% of the respondents believed that economic 
inequality in Korea was widespread. Likewise, when respondents were stratified into five asset 
groups and cross-tabulated with awareness of inequality, little difference was made between 
groups. As shown in Figure 6, across all the five groups, over 85% of the respondents shared the 
idea that distribution of income and asset of Korea was unequal.  
The popular awareness of economic inequality of Korea was not unique to the 1990 
survey finding. The follow-up surveys in 1995, 2000, and 2005 all confirmed the presence of 
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widespread public awareness of economic inequality. In the 1995 survey, 87.4% of the 
respondents as a whole believed that economic distribution of Korea was unequal (See Figure 7). 
When different socio-economic status groups were compared, little inter-group differences in the 
awareness of economic inequality were found (see Figures 8 and 9). The same findings were 
observed in the 2000 and 2005 opinion research as well. In both surveys, 90.3% and 82.4% of 
the respondents as a whole, respectively, believed that distribution in Korea was unequal (see 
Figures 10 and 13), and such beliefs were commonly held within different socio-economic status 
groups (See Figures 11 and 12 for the 2000 survey, and 14 and 15 for the 2005 survey).   
 As is evident from the foregoing data, a clear majority of the Korean population has 
subscribed, over years, to the belief that economic inequality of Korea is severe. However, such 
popular views of large economic inequality in public opinion are somewhat baffling when the 
actual distribution of Korea, especially during the 1990s, is examined. According to much of the 
research on the distribution in the 1990s (Ku 2006; Lee and Hwang 1998; Lee and Lee 2001a; 
Lee and Lee 2001b; Lew 1998; Moon and Lew 1999; Son 2001), the 1990s, at least before the 
1997 crisis, was a prosperous and leveled-off decade during which rapid economic growth and 
improvements in average living standards took place with decreasing income inequality. 
 According to Lew’s analysis (1998) in which the Gini coefficient and the p90/p10 were 
estimated from the wage structure survey, income inequality in Korea began to decline from the 
early 1980s, and continued to decline throughout the middle 1990s before the crisis fell (see 
Table 1). Similarly, estimation of Gini coefficient and p80/p20 by the Korean National Statistical 
Office (KNSO) demonstrates a parallel trend of economic inequality in the 1990s. Whether 
17 
 
measured by market or disposable income, the overall reduction in both inequality measures took 
place throughout the 1990s (see Table 2).  
Apparently, popular awareness of economic inequality among Koreans in both the 1990 
and 1995 surveys presents a contrast to the actual distributive condition of Korea. The contrast 
between the two—namely, the discrepancy between popular beliefs about inequality and the 
reality of inequality—leaves us the following questions to explore: Are Koreans overly 
conscious of economic inequality? In other words, does Korean public systematically 
misperceive income distribution in society and erroneously believe in more inequality than is 
there? As perceptions of existing state of affairs do facilitate a particular attitude on a specific 
policy, false perceptions of economic inequality have social consequences of distorting people’s 
policy preferences.       
As study of public perceptions has revealed, people’s perceptual process and its 
byproduct, namely, perceived reality, are not necessarily accurate enough to mirror reality as it is; 
instead, human perception has been found to be easily influenced by the values and other 
properties found inside the individual perceiver, e.g., prior expectations, misinformation, 
motivations, and emotions, and, as a result, people are easily misled into faulty and illusory 
beliefs (Cohen 1982; Kuklinski et al. 2000; Kuklinski et al. 1998; Kunda 1987; Kunda 1990; 
Kunda 1999; Lerner 1980; Lind and Tyler 1988; Thomas 1966). For instance, Kuklinski et al. 
(2000) demonstrated the influence of misinformation about welfare on the American public’s 
perception of welfare, in which they found that while many Americans were inaccurate in their 
factual beliefs about welfare due to misinformation, they were rather confident that they were 
right and resisted correct their beliefs, which Kuklinski et al. deemed as an obstacle to educate 
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the public. Such erroneous beliefs, Kuklinski et al. warned, could greatly distort collective voices 
of people by facilitating policy preferences that were far different from what would have existed 
if people were correctly informed.  
Therefore, faulty and illusory as they may be, misperceptions, or factual beliefs that are 
far off the mark, are consequential. As the Thomas theorem (1928) formulated, what we perceive 
as real in social life becomes real in its consequences. In other words, perceived reality is more 
real and consequential to our behavior than is reality itself. By the same token, Merton (1968) 
coined the expression, “self-fulfilling prophecy,” and formalized its structure and consequences. 
He said, 
The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation 
evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come ‘true.’ 
This specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. 
For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right 
from the very beginning. (P. 477) 
Presumably, the Korean public’s knowledge and perception of economic inequality would not be 
immune to the same cognitive misapprehension. In discussing public awareness of inequality, 
scholars  have put a special emphasis on the dominant justice ideology(Abercrombie, Hill and 
Turner 1990; Csepeli and Örkény 1992; Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 
1959; Lane 1962; Lane 1986; Lodge and Vogel 1987; McClosky and Zaller 1984b; Wegener and 
Liebig 1995a). The dominant justice ideology thesis assumes that each society has a consistent 
ideology that is shared by the majority of a society, ideally by all of its members, for evaluating 
distributions of goods. According to Wegener and Liebig (1995a), the dominant, or ‘primary’ in 
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their expression, justice ideology functions in such a way that it creates an encompassing 
consensus view of socio-economic inequality among the public, providing a normative basis for 
evaluating the social legitimation of inequality. What is noteworthy is the link between the 
dominant ideology and culture of a society they theorized on. They noted:    
It [primary ideology] will be rooted in the cultural history of a society, exerting a 
normative influence on the beliefs most or even all people have about how goods 
should be distributed. Therefore, the nature of these beliefs must be reconstructed 
by going back to the cultural values that have developed in a society’s history. (P. 
242) 
As a cultural product, the dominant justice ideology of a society, Wegener and Liebig 
theorized, could exert a normative influence on people’s justice beliefs about ‘what ought to be,’ 
namely, how distribution should be made. Beyond their initial assumption, I further speculate 
that the ideology can also engage people’s beliefs about ‘what is,’ namely, the perception of 
economic inequality in reality, for the reasons that human perception of reality is by and large 
influenced by prior expectations, misinformation, motivations, and emotions, and is easily 
misled into faulty and illusory belief. For illustration, I introduce Jasso’s justice evaluation 
theory here. Jasso (1978; 1977) proposed that the justice evaluation of income apportionment 
could be expressed as a function of actual and expected incomes, a function specified as the log 
ratio of actual to expected incomes. In this formulation, the numerator, namely, the actual 
income people make, is for the most part pre-fixed by socioeconomic conditions, and hardly 
changes by personal desire. In contrast, the denominator, namely, the amount of income people 
expect to earn, is relatively subjective, mostly shaped by personal aspirations (or self-interest) 
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and distributive orientations they believe to be just. Therefore, it is appropriate to speculate that 
the subjective satisfaction people feel with their current income is less a function of the 
numerator than of the denominator. The larger the denominator, the more likely they are to feel 
deprived with their current income, depreciating the relative utility (or value) of the actual 
income they earn.  
A similar cognitive mechanism could be applicable to people’s perception of economic 
disparities. As Wegener and Liebig noted, popular beliefs about how resources should be 
distributed is a function of the dominant, or primary, justice ideology of a society. This suggests 
that the ideology frames people’s image of a legitimate distribution in a society. If the majority 
of a society believes that society needs a more equalized share of distribution than what is 
available now, their expected economic distribution, namely, the denominator of the ratio, will 
increase, while the actual distribution they come across, namely, the numerator, changes little, if 
at all. As the ratio between the two decreases due to a large denominator, subjective satisfaction 
with the current distribution in a society is likely to decrease as well. In other words, the relative 
equity of the current economic disparities will be under-appreciated, and the threat of economic 
disparities in a society will loom larger and appear worse than what really exists.  
Therefore, I suggest that popular awareness of economic inequality among the Korean 
public can be analyzed in reference to the dominant, or primary, justice ideology that ideally all 
Koreans, if not the majority, subscribe to, the essence of which, as Wegener and Liebig theorized, 
is anchored into the cultural values of Korean society. According to the Hofstede’s research 
(2001), among the five cultural dimensions—namely, power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation—Korea scored significantly lower than most 
21 
 
Western and non-Western countries on the IDV, a dimension that measures the strength of 
individualistic cultural orientation. On a scale of 100, Korea scored 18, while Western nations 
such as the U.S., Australia, the U.K, Netherlands, and Canada, scored 91, 90, 89, and 80, 
respectively (for detail, see Figures 16 and 17). This suggests that in Korean culture, a 
collectivist orientation is much more pronounced than an individualist orientation. Indeed, it is 
not unusual to note that Koreans tend to consider a high level of collective homogeneity as a 
social virtue, and do not tolerate social differences that may pose a threat to social unity. In terms 
of social justice, such a collectivist cultural orientation is more likely to find an egalitarian 
account of justice more appealing than a meritocratic account of justice, because the latter 
essentially brings the premise of unequal worthiness of human beings into relief in order to 
justify differences in the treatment of people. Therefore, it appears to be critical to take this 
collectivist cultural context of Korea into account in discussing the dominant justice ideology of 
Korea and its normative influence on people’s evaluation of economic inequality.  
So far, I have discussed popular beliefs about economic inequality in Korea. Apparently, 
the vast majority of Koreans have been concerned about economic inequality in a society. 
Contrast to popular belief, however, research on income distribution in Korea during the 1990s 
presented evidence that income distribution in Korea actually has improved over time. If this is 
the case, then the threat of economic inequality of Korea may have been overestimated by the 
Korean public. That is, people have been overly concerned about inequality in the society. In the 
following section, thus, I will examine whether, and, if so, to what extent discrepancy between 
popular beliefs about economic inequality and economic reality of Korea holds. To this end, I 
will employ a comparative analysis where public awareness of economic inequality of Korea is 
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contrasted to that of other countries. Given the varying levels of economic inequality between 
countries, is the Korean public’s awareness of economic inequality more out of proportion than 
that of others?  
2.2. CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS OF DISCREPANCY BETWEEN 
PERCEIVED AND OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: HOW DOES 
KOREA COMPARE? 
 The focus here is twofold: first, how does the public awareness of economic inequality of 
Korea compare to that of other countries?; and second, when the varying levels of economic 
inequality between countries are controlled for, how does the Korean public’s evaluation of 
economic inequality compare? Is the threat of economic inequality that Koreans perceive 
exaggerated, out of all proportion to the actual threat posed? 
2.2.1. DATA 
 For analysis, the following survey, the 1999/2003 International Social Survey Programme 
on Social Inequality (the 1999/2003 ISSP, hereafter)—was employed. As a representative survey 
of persons aged eighteen and older, the 1999 survey was originally fielded in twenty-seven 
countries between 1998 and 2001 to collect public opinion on social inequality
3
. The survey 
dealt mainly with attitudes towards income inequality, views on earnings and incomes, 
legitimation of inequality, career advancement by means of family background and networks, 
social cleavages and conflict among groups, and the current and past social position. As an 
extension of the cross-national 1999 survey, the 2003 ISSP survey was fielded in Korea only, 
                                                 
3
 Survey years vary from country to country. For details, refer to the codebook of the 1999 survey, which is 
available at http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/social-inequality/1999/.  
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because it was not until 2003 that Korea acquired official membership in ISSP. Later the same 
year, the Korean General Social Survey conducted a partially replicated 1999 ISSP survey on its 
own in Korea.  
For comparative purposes, nineteen OECD countries—Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand,  Northern 
Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United States—were selected 
from the 1999 survey data, and compared to the Korean data from the 2003 survey. Apart from 
the differences in the survey year and the number of questions replicated, the two surveys are 
comparable in other respects—the survey in Korea also was fielded on a nationally 
representative sample of persons aged eighteen and older, using multi-stage stratified sampling.  
2.2.2. MEASURES 
1. SUBJECTIVE MEASURE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: PUBLIC BELIEF 
ABOUT WHAT IS AND THE JUSTICE GAP 
 In order to measure people’s subjective awareness of economic inequality, the following 
questions were employed from the survey. 
 Q 1. Do you agree or disagree… 
Differences in income in [your country] are too large.   
Respondents specified their level of agreement to the statement, using a five-point scale—
‘strongly agree,’ ‘agree,’ ‘neither disagree nor agree,’ ‘disagree,’ and ‘strongly disagree.’ Since 
varying public awareness of economic inequality across countries is of interest, I estimated the 
proportion of respondents who believed that differences in income in their nation were too large. 
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To this end, percentages corresponding to the two positive responses, ‘strongly agree’ and 
‘agree,’ were summed for each nation.    
 Another subjective measure that I used for analysis is the justice gap. This measure was 
originally operationalized by Verwiebe and Wegener (2000), and they derived its conceptual 
base from Jasso’s core theory of justice (Jasso 1978; Jasso 1980; Jasso and Rossi 1977). 
According to Jasso, individual justice evaluations are based on a comparison of observed actual 
rewards and rewards considered as just. In mathematical terms, the justice evaluation function, J, 
is denoted as the natural logarithm of the actual reward over the just reward. Thus, 
Jij =ln(Aij/Cij),   where i=person, j=a series of justice stimuli. 
The numerator, A, expresses the actual reward of person i and the denominator, C, expresses the 
just reward. When J takes a positive value, it indicates that the person, i, is over rewarded than he 
or she should be rewarded; for a negative value, it means that the person, i, is under rewarded 
than what he or should be rewarded; and for zero, it means that the person, i, is justly rewarded.  
 Following this theory, this function has widely been adopted and modified in the study of 
justice evaluations at both individual and societal levels (Gijsberts 2002; Hadler 2005; Headey 
1991a; Kelley and Evans 1993; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000; Wegener and Steinmann 1995). 
Amongst all, Verwiebe and Wegener (2000) created a measure called the justice gap of the 
income distribution. The justice gap, according to them, is a measure of the perceived injustice of 
the income distribution in a society, which delivers “the expression of discontent with what is, 
derived, in our scheme of reward justice, from the justice evaluations of incomes” (p. 144). For 
example, a just gap exists, if the earned income of a well-paid position is considered as unjustly 
over rewarded whereas the earned income of a not so well paid position is considered as unjustly 
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under rewarded. The first remuneration is too high, in the eyes of those who make the justice 
evaluations, the second is too low. Thus the justice gap is constituted by the difference in the 
subjective justice evaluations of rewards that are given to holders of occupational or any other 
kind of social positions. The importance of this measure with regard to my study is that the 
justice gap is a result-related notion of justice, namely, evaluation of the extent to which given 
outcome is fair or unfair, and it contains two important evaluative information that people have 
about inequality: the degree of perceived gap and the fairness of the perceived gap. The wider 
the perceived gap, he or she believes that there exists a larger inequality between the two 
positions compared, and, more importantly, such gap is unjust. If the gap is zero, then there is no 
inequality between the two positions compared and stands for a perfect justness. 
 Having defined the justice gap as the difference between an individual’s justice 
evaluations of the earnings in two occupational positions, the formula has been constructed as 
follows, 
Ji,G =Ji,a- Ji,b, where i=person, a=occupation 1, and b=occupation 2. 
Both Ji,a and Ji,b represent the same justice evaluation function that Jasso originally introduced. If 
the actual income for occupation a is higher than the just income, Ji,a takes a positive value; that 
is, the actual income of the occupation is regarded as an over reward; if a negative value, then it 
refers to an under reward; and, a just reward if zero. The justice gap, Ji,G, then is simply 
expressed as the arithmetic difference between Ji,a and Ji,b. The Ji,G is the largest if occupation 1 is 
considered to be widely over rewarded and occupation 2 is dramatically under rewarded.  
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In the 1999/2003 ISSP, respondents were asked to give estimates of, first, how much, on 
average, persons with certain occupations earn and, second, how much they should earn for their 
income to be a just income. The actual wording used is  
Q 1. I would like to know what you think people in these jobs —i.e., the 
chairman of a large national corporation, unskilled worker in a factory—actually 
earn each month before taxes.  
Q 2. Next, what do you think people in these jobs—i.e., the chairmen of a large national 
corporation, unskilled worker in a factory— ought to be paid? How much do you think 
they should earn each month before taxes, regardless of what they actually get. 
In my analysis, following Verwiebe and Wegener (2000)’s example, the two occupations, the 
chairman of a large national corporation and unskilled worker in a factory, were selected, given 
the assumption that the two occupations represent the closest virtual end points of the income 
continuum in reality. For both occupations, the respective perceived justice evaluations, i.e., Ji, 
chairman and Ji, unskilled worker, were calculated for each individual respondent, using the justice 
evaluation function described above. Then, Ji,G, i.e., the justice gap between Ji,chairman and Ji,unskilled 
worker, was obtained from the arithmetic difference between the two, with the expectation value 
E(Ji,G ) characterizing the perceived justice gap of a total population or subgroups. The largest 
positive Ji,G would occur when the chairman is considered to be dramatically over rewarded and 
the unskilled worker dramatically under rewarded; in contrast, the largest negative Ji,G would 
occur when the unskilled worker is considered to be dramatically over rewarded and the 
chairman dramatically under rewarded.              
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2. OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: WHAT REALLY IS  
 The Gini coefficient (GI) 
 Half the squared coefficient of variation (½ SCV) 
 The mean log deviation (MLD) 
 The P90/P10  
 For analysis, the foregoing four barometers of economic inequality were employed. As 
Schwartz and Winship (1980) and Allison (1978) noted, early empirical studies of inequality 
committed the common methodological error of drawing upon a single index of inequality. This 
is problematic in that inequality is not necessarily a one-dimensional concept; in order to 
encompass and measure its diverse aspects, they argued, different indices should be considered 
together. To the extent that different measures can yield different results and interpretations of 
economic inequality, it is important to provide multiple, but more importantly proper, measures 
of inequality. In this regard, Schwartz and Winship (1980) suggested three general axioms for 
selecting measures of inequality: principles of transfers, population symmetry, and scale 
invariance. The first axiom, also known as the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, is simply the 
idea that if transferring money from the rich to the poor makes one distribution match another, 
the former distribution is less equal than the latter. The second axiom, coined by Sen (1973), 
requires two distributions of unequal size to be made comparable by adjusting group sizes. That 
is, even if two groups are of different sizes, comparison is made possible by weighting the 
populations. The final axiom requires measures to be robust in response to changes of measuring 
units. The currency which is used to measure income should not alter the result. In addition, 
Allison (1978) argued that measures of inequality should respond to relative, not absolute, 
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differences among individuals, since, as Blau also noted (1977), people are more sensitive to 
their relative position in the income distribution than to absolute differences in income level.  
Given the basic criteria, the following four, probably most commonly used, indices—the 
Gini coefficient (GI), half the squared coefficient of variation (½ SCV), the mean log deviation 
(MLD), and the P90/P10 ratio—were selected for analysis. While the first three indices all meet 
the general criteria of inequality measurement, they differ in their sensitivity to income in 
different parts of the distribution. For instance, the GI is sensitive to the middle of the 
distribution, since it measures income inequality based on individuals’ ranks, not on their 
absolute numerical income values. That is, the change in the GI is a linear function of the 
number of people who are positioned between two points of the income distribution (Schwartz 
and Winship 1980). Therefore, as most individuals are located in the middle of the income 
distribution, the GI tends to give more weight to transfers among people in the middle of the 
distribution than transfers at either end of the distribution, i.e., the rich and the poor.  
Unlike the GI, both the ½ SCV and the MLD are members of the Generalized Entropy 
(GE) family of inequality measures. Depending on the level of α, the weight given to the 
distance between incomes at different parts of the income distribution, the GE shows varying 
degrees of sensitivity to income differences in the distribution, with larger values of α 
corresponding to greater sensitivity to income differences at the top. According to Cowell and 
Flachaire (2007), the GE measures with α > 1 are very sensitive to high incomes in the 
distribution, while α ≤ 0 makes the GE measures very sensitive to low incomes in the distribution. 
Thus, the ½ SCV, where the value of α is equal to 2, is very sensitive to the individuals with high 
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incomes in the distribution, whereas the MLD, where the value of α is equal to 0, is very 
sensitive to the individuals with low incomes in the distribution.  
Finally, the P90/P10 is the ratio of the 90th income percentile to the 10th income 
percentile in the distribution. Unlike the first three inequality measures, this ratio measure 
highlights the gulf in incomes between the middle 80% of the distribution. That is, it compares 
the income of individuals ‘near’ the top of the income distribution with that of individuals ‘near’ 
the bottom. Accordingly, it does not capture the overall income inequality in the distribution, but 
provides a readily interpretable measure and an intuitive sense of polarization in the distribution.  
Due to the differing characteristics of inequality measures, as illustrated above, it is more 
reliable to use a set of measures together than to rely on a single parameter, whether the scope of 
comparison is within nations or between nations. For this reason, Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), for 
instance, used five indices of inequality which differed in their sensitivity to incomes in different 
parts of the distribution, ranging from high-income sensitivity (the ½SCV) to middle income 
sensitivity (the GI and the Theil index) and low-income sensitivity (the MLD and the variance of 
the logarithm), in order to capture the longitudinal impact of income mobility among the 
individuals (or groups) over time in Britain. Similarly, Goodman and Oldfield (2004) used four 
measures—the GI, the P90/P10, income shares of different decile and percentile groups of the 
distribution, and the ½SCV—in order to detect changes in global inequality over time. Firebaugh 
(1999), to challenge the polarization thesis of dependency theory, also used four indices—the GI, 
the Theil index, the SCV, and the variance of the logarithm—and showed how different 
interpretations of inter-country income inequality could be derived from the choice of indices.  
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Therefore, employing multiple indices of inequality is crucial to the comparisons of 
inequality. The three measures of inequality which were employed in this paper—the ½SCV, the 
GI, and the MLD—provide a balanced insight into income inequality to the extent that each of 
the indices represents “high income sensitivity”, “middle income sensitivity,” and “low income 
sensitivity,” respectively; thus, using them together can produce more accurate picture of income 
inequality than a single index. In addition, the P90/P10 ratio serves as an intuitive measure of 
income disparity, particularly between the rich and the poor in society. A society with a larger 
disparity between the two groups may have more potential for polarization than a society with a 
smaller disparity.    
2.2.3. METHODS 
 In order to show in comparative terms the extent to which the Korean public’s assessment 
of income differences deviates from reality, I used twenty OECD countries as a unit of analysis, 
and the total percentages of the respondents perceiving income inequality as too large obtained 
for an individual country (as a dependent variable) were regressed on each of the four income 
inequality measures that the country has (as independent variables). The underlying assumption 
is that if perception exactly mirrors reality as it is, a country with a lower income inequality in 
reality should have a correspondingly smaller percentage of respondents perceiving income 
inequality as too large than a country with a higher income inequality in reality. If a country does 
not fall within this linear prediction and shows a certain degree of deviation, the country is a case 
where discrepancy between perceived and actual income inequality exists.  
To elaborate, if a country falls above the predicted linear line, more of the public in the 
country than expected actually view income inequality in their country as severe for the actual 
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level of income inequality. Conversely, if a country falls below the predicted line, less of the 
public in the country than expected view income inequality in their country as severe. In other 
words, for its actual level of income inequality, less of the public than expected are conscious of 
its severity. Given the foregoing logic, I used the sum of the four sets of residuals obtained in 
each regression analysis as a measure of the discrepancy between perceived and actual income 
inequality of a given country. 
As for the justice gap, the expectation value, E(Ji,G ), was obtained for each nation, which 
characterized the perceived justice gap of a total population. As discussed, these values indicate 
the level of perceived injustice of the income distribution in a society. The higher the E(Ji,G ), the 
more discontent the public is with income distribution in their society. The E(Ji,G )s were, then, 
compared to the sum of the four sets of residuals obtained above.  
2.2.4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Table 3 compares the four inequality measures between twenty OECD countries. 
Analysis of the measures suggests that countries, depending on the choice of the measures, vary 
in their relative ranking against other countries. For instance, in the case of the MLD, with a 
value of 24.08, the United States has the highest level of inequality amongst all. Similarly, 
Poland, Korea, New Zealand, Spain, and Portugal all exceed the value of 20, comprising a high-
inequality group as well. Considering that the MLD is sensitive to inequality near the bottom of 
the distribution, these countries have a relatively higher level of inequality at the bottom of the 
distribution than other countries. In contrast, the Nordic countries, especially Sweden and 
Denmark, rank last of all countries, suggesting that they have greater equality at the bottom of 
the distribution than most other countries. 
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As measured by the P90/P10 ratio, the United States again has the highest level of 
inequality amongst all; the ninetieth percentile household earns over five times as much as the 
tenth percentile household. Similarly, in both Portugal and Japan, the ninetieth percentile 
household earns five times as much as the tenth percentile household. In contrast, the three 
Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, as was the case with the MLD, have the 
smallest ratios of all—2.8, 2.8, and 2.7, respectively—indicating a very low level of income 
polarization between the top and the bottom of the distribution. In case of Korea, its relative 
stance does not appear as bad as it did with the MLD. In Korea, the ninetieth percentile 
household earns four times as much as the tenth percentile household, and this gap is only ninth 
largest of all twenty countries, putting Korea at the medium position.  
The other two measures, the GI and the ½SCV, also provide a comparably positive 
outlook for Korea’s income inequality against other counterparts’. In terms of the GI, Korea 
ranks eighth from the top with the value of .306. Compared to the average GI of .297 for the 
twenty countries, Korea’s GI is slightly higher. However, Korea’s income inequality may well be 
clustered around the middle of the ranking along with Australia, Northern Ireland, Canada, and 
Hungary. This implies that, in contrast to the large income disparity between the top and the 
bottom of the distribution, inequality across other parts of the income distribution in Korea is 
relatively moderate, as compared to other OECD countries. Similarly, the ½SCV measure 
renders a moderate outlook of economic inequality of Korea. The ninth highest of all, the ½SCV 
of Korea is 18.87, which is much smaller than the average ½SCV of 23.03 for the twenty 
countries. Considering that the ½SCV is sensitive to the top of the distribution, the below-
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average ½SCV value of Korea suggests that income concentration at the very top of Korea may 
be relatively moderate, compared to other OECD countries.  
Given the comparisons of the inequality measures above, Korea’s income inequality may 
well cluster around both the top and middle of the ranking for all the measures used. When 
compared by the MLD, Korea has greater income disparities than many of other OECD 
counterparts. However, the relative inequality level of Korea, as measured by the P90/P10, GI, 
and ½SCV, becomes moderate and smaller. Unlike Korea, some countries are fairly robust to the 
choice of the inequality measures. In general, higher inequality levels are consistently marked by 
the United States, Poland, New Zealand, Spain, and Portugal, whereas lower levels of inequality 
are marked by the Nordic countries and Austria.  
Coming to the public appraisal of income differences in their country, Figure 18 displays 
the percentages of the respondents who agree with the statement that income inequality in their 
country is too large. While in all twenty OECD countries a majority of the respondents agreed 
that income differences in their countries are too large, variation in the percentages of the 
respondents between countries cannot be overlooked. The range runs from 59.5% to 96%. Of the 
twenty countries, Denmark and the United States record the two smallest percentages, 59.5% and 
66.2%, respectively, followed by 69.1% for Japan, 69.5% for Northern Ireland, and 70.6% for 
Canada. Portugal, on the other hand, marks the largest percentage, 96%, followed by 93.7% for 
Slovakia. In the case of Korea, the percentage is 93.2%, ranking third from the top. This clearly 
shows that even from a cross national perspective, the Korean public’s beliefs about large 
income inequality are more conspicuous than that of most of the other OECD countries.  
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What is noteworthy here is that varying public awareness of income inequality between 
countries does not closely match country differences in the four inequality measures discussed 
above. For instance, in the above, it was noted that both the United States and Portugal 
consistently score high on inequality across the four measures. However, when it comes to public 
awareness of inequality, the two countries demonstrate a sharp contrast, since the United States 
has the second smallest proportion of respondents of all, whereas Portugal has the largest 
proportion of all. This weak association between real and perceived inequality is not be limited 
to these two countries. Korea may also experience a degree of discrepancy between real and 
perceived inequality. To measure varying degrees of discrepancy between real and perceived 
inequality for countries, I regressed the percentages of the respondents perceiving income 
differences in their country as too large on each measure of income inequality, and obtained 
standardized residuals, i.e., standardized differences between the observed proportions of 
respondents and the proportions predicted by the regression. The resulting four sets of residuals 
are presented in Table 4, where Residuals 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the standardized residuals obtained 
from regressing the proportions of respondents on the GI, the ½SCV, the MLD, and the P90/P10 
ratios, respectively. Negative regression residuals in the table are the cases where the observed 
proportions of respondents in countries are smaller than what they are expected to be, after 
controlling for country differences in the inequality measures compared. In other words, a 
negative residual occurs as the actual magnitude of income disparity of a country is 
underestimated and, as a result, fewer people than expected are aware of the problem; otherwise, 
more respondents in country would have agreed that income differences in their county are too 
large. I call this case a ‘deflated public awareness of income inequality.’ In contrast, positive 
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residuals point to the opposite interpretation: that is, a positive residual occurs as the magnitude 
of income disparity of country is overestimated and, as a result, more people than expected 
express their concerns. I call this case an ‘inflated public awareness of inequality’. The last 
column in Table 4 tallies up the four residuals for countries.  
It is evident from the analysis of the tallied residuals that all countries experience certain 
degrees of discrepancy between perceived and actual inequality since no country has a zero sum 
of residuals. However, two countries—Germany and Great Britain—show the lowest sums of 
residuals of all, -0.083 and 0.658, respectively, implying that the public in the two countries, 
compared to other OECD publics, are more acutely aware of the level of income disparity in 
their country. The most deflated public awareness of income inequality of all is observed in 
Denmark (-6.678), followed by the United States (-5.543), Japan (-4.102), Northern Ireland (-
3.800), Canada (-3.324), and Australia (-3.279). In contrast, the most inflated public awareness 
of income inequality of all is observed in Slovakia (5.368), followed by Portugal (5.253), and 
Hungary (4.811). Korea shows the fourth largest inflated perception of inequality (3.808), 
indicating that public awareness of a large economic disparity in Korea is out of all proportion to 
the actual inequality level.  
 Of interest is that the observed pattern of public awareness of income inequality among 
OECD countries above may relate, crudely as it may turn out to be, to Esping-Anderson’s three 
welfare regimes typology (1990). According to him, social-democratic welfare states such as 
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark promote the principle of universalism, granting access to 
benefits and services based on citizenship, and limit the reliance of family and market to provide 
a relatively high degree of autonomy against social inequality and commodification of social 
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provisions. In contrast, liberal welfare regime states, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Japan, and increasingly the United Kingdom, are based on the principles of market dominance 
and private provision, idealizing the freedom of market competition and minimizing the state 
intervention. As the ideals of liberalism incorporate the maximization of the free market and hold 
all individuals responsible for their own economic fates, a low level of decommodification and a 
high degree of social inequality prevail. Lastly, countries such as Germany, France, Spain, and 
Austria are considered conservative. In these countries, while market justice norms still remain at 
the center of distributive justice, the principle of subsidiary and the dominance of social 
insurance schemes offset a high degree of social inequality, offering a medium level of 
decommodification, unlike in the individualistic liberal welfare states.  
 In lights of the welfare regime typology above, the public awareness of income inequality 
of four conservative welfare regime states—Germany, France, Spain, and Austria—was found 
most inflated, the average of which is 2.14, of all three regimes; the remaining two welfare 
regimes, social-democratic and liberal welfare regimes, were both characterized by a deflated 
public awareness, where the average public awareness of income inequality of three social-
democratic welfare states—Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—is -3.86 and that of five liberal 
welfare states—the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom—is -3.118. 
This resulting difference in public awareness of, or public sensitivity to, income inequality 
among the three welfare regimes may result from the complexity of different social policy 
arrangements and public attitudes toward capitalism, especially their normative orientations 
toward market justice and economic inequality in principle. In case of Korea, whose 
classification admittedly cannot be subsumed under the conventional welfare regime typology 
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above, its highly inflated public awareness of income inequality, 3.808, far exceeds that of any 
conservative welfare regime states, not to mention their average, whose state corporatist 
characteristics would provide a more comparable lens for the institutional configuration of 
Korean welfare than the two other regimes. Koreans’ inflated awareness of income inequality 
rather makes a remarkable resemblance to their counterparts in post-communist regime states 
such as Slovakia, Hungary, and Czech Republic where the transition to the market economy 
generates a multifaceted social conflict between the old and new social orders as more people 
than ever are becoming marginalized due to the growing economic disparities in the society and 
people feel nostalgic for the culture of equality experienced under communism in the past 
(Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1995; Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1999; Turkina and Surzhko-
Harned 2011). Ironically, Koreans, despite their lack of socialist legacy in both economic and 
political culture in the past, rather demonstrated as strong a sensitivity to the issue of economic 
inequity as their post-communist counterparts did.  
 In sum, the analysis found, first, that public awareness of economic inequality in Korea is 
more salient than that of most OECD counterparts; second, that a weak association between real 
and perceived economic inequality holds across the four inequality measures of Korea (and most 
of other OECD countries as well); and third, that, after controlling for country differences in 
various inequality measures, popular misperception of large income inequality of Korea is more 
overstated than that of most OECD counterparts and demonstrates a similar pattern to those seen 
in the post-communist states. Thus, it is now evident that popular beliefs about large economic 
inequality of Korea are, for the most part, overstated, as contrasted with varying income 
distributions of OECD countries.  
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With respect to the justice gap, the county means of the justice evaluations of the 
chairmen, E(Ji,chairman), unskilled worker, E(Ji,unskilled), and the justice gap between the two, 
E(Ji,G ), are summarized in Table 5. What is noteworthy is that in all countries the justice 
evaluation of unskilled worker is negatively assessed, meaning that unskilled worker is all 
perceived to be under rewarded; in contrast, the chairman of a large national corporation is all 
perceived to be overpaid. Nonetheless, differences between countries are noticeable. In terms of 
the justice evaluations of the chairman, E(Ji,chairman), Slovakia has the smallest value of .192, 
followed by Spain (.280) and Japan (.283). The highest value of .687, in contrast, is found in 
Great Britain. Following Great Britain, Korea ranked second highest of all, with the value 
of .631. This shows that Koreans, along with people in Great Britain, do see more injustice in the 
reward for the chairman than other OECD publics do.  
The justice evaluation of unskilled worker, E(Ji,unskilled), on the other hand, takes all 
negative values across countries, indicating that people overall share a similar belief that 
unskilled workers are underpaid in the society. Yet, there are noticeable country differences, too: 
first, the lowest three values, -113, -123, and -.145 are all matched to the three Nordic countries, 
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, respectively. Considering that these nations experience a very 
low level of polarization (see P90/P10 for these countries in Table 3) and most citizens, 
especially low wage-earners, benefit most from the core welfare programs that government 
provides, for respondents in these countries not to see unskilled workers as severely underpaid or 
disadvantaged seems to reflect their reality correctly. The situation, however, is quite different in 
Hungary and Slovakia. The two highest values of -.597 and -.577 indicate that respondents in the 
two post-communist countries do see substantial injustice in rewards for unskilled workers. 
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While not as severe as these two nations, Korea also shows a relative high level of perceived 
injustice toward the unskilled workers’ reward (-.317), ranking seventh highest of all.  
Finally, looking at the justice gap between the two occupations, E(Ji,G ), the variation 
across countries is more apparent. With the variation ranging from .442 to 1.041 with a global 
mean of .703, the smallest justice gap is found in Denmark and the largest in Hungary. Of 
interest is that Norway, another social-democratic welfare state like Denmark, also marks the  
comparably smallest justice gap of all, hinting at the universal satisfaction among the general 
public under the social-democratic welfare regimes with the equity in their current income 
distribution. While Sweden, unlike its two fellow social-democratic states, may not necessarily 
make a compelling case to this assumption for its relative distance from the two as shown in 
Table 5, it is worth noting that the overall public discontent with the equity in current income 
distribution in the social-democratic welfare regime is less conspicuous than in the other two 
regimes as the average justice gap of .502 of the three exemplary social-democratic states is 
smaller than .728 of the five exemplary liberal welfare states (the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom) and .618 of the four exemplary conservative welfare 
states (Germany, France, Spain, and Austria). Apparently, this observation very closely 
corresponds to the socio-economic landscape of the three welfare regimes in general. As noted 
earlier, the social-democratic welfare states clearly outperform the other two regimes in the areas 
of decommodification and social stratification in society. While both the conservative and liberal 
regimes may share a high level of social stratification, the conservative regimes do better in 
offering a medium level of decommodification than their liberal counterparts for their reliance on 
the principle of subsidiarity and the dominance of social insurance schemes. Therefore, the fact 
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that the equity issue creates the least dissatisfaction, or perceived injustice, for people in the 
social-democratic regimes while it does more for those in the conservative and the most in the 
liberal regimes is comprehensible. Compared with the mass publics in all three welfare regime 
states, especially those in the social-democratic regime, the Korean public’s overall discontent 
with the equity in current income distribution is extremely high and only comparable to its 
counterparts in Hungary and other post-communist states such as Poland, Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia, whose average justice gap is as high as .847. As the multiple comparisons of E(Ji,G ) 
between Korea and others in Table 6 show, the justice gap of Korea does differ significantly 
from others for the most part; especially, most of the positive differences, i.e., Korea being larger, 
remains significant, whereas the only negative difference from Hungary is insignificant. This, 
therefore, concludes that not only is Koreans’ perceived injustice of the income distribution in 
the society most conspicuous of all, but also Koreans, as was the case with the inflated public 
awareness of large income inequality, share very much similar injustice perceptions toward the 
equity in current income distribution in society with their post-communist counterparts.   
In sum, the foregoing analyses characterize the Korean public’s views of income 
inequality in two ways: First, the Korean public’s beliefs in large income differences in the 
society, compared to other OECD counterparts’, are much more inflated for the actual inequality 
level of Korea. A large and positive sum of residuals for Korea, which was obtained from the 
regression analyses above, confirmed this finding. Second, not only do Koreans have an inflated 
awareness of income inequality, but also they retain a high level of perceived injustice of current 
income distribution as their post-communist counterparts do.  
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 Why, then, is such an inflated perception of income inequality prevalent among the 
Korean public? Why do people perceive more income differences in the society than are there? 
Is it because, as the large justice gap for Korea indicated, Koreans perceive a high level of 
injustice of the income distribution in the society? Previous research has shown that a low level 
of perceived legitimacy of existing economic order facilitates a low level of public tolerance for 
economic inequality in the society (Kluegel and Mason 2004; Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 
1999). Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener (1999), for example, in their study of public opinion 
changes in post-communist nations, noted that growing tolerance for a greater range of inequality 
among post-communist citizens was preceded by a high level of perceived legitimacy of 
economic system, as their capitalist transitions were successfully achieved; during the transition, 
however, typically when the born of early transition revolutionary zeal faded, people in those 
countries questioned the fairness of new market system, and a corresponding tolerance for a 
limited fair range of inequality prevailed with growing public support for government 
intervention to reduce inequality. Such popular regressing to the past heritage, namely, retreating 
to old socialist justice norms, according to Kluegel and his colleagues, stemmed from the popular 
distrust of the current economic order. Given their explanations, the same relationship may hold 
between perceived legitimacy of income distribution in a society and its impact on people’s 
tolerance of income inequality. Suppose two countries with similar distributions of income. The 
consequences of income inequality, however, may not be the same, when people in two countries 
view income inequality in very different ways. Where tolerance for inequality is exercised only 
within a limited range due to a high level of perceived injustice of the income distribution in the 
society, the level of differences is more likely to be exaggerated, easily promoting social unrest 
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and conflicts. On the other hand, where tolerance for a greater range of inequality is exercised 
due to a low level of perceived injustice of the income distribution, the same differences may 
well be unnoticed, or even rejected, as too equal. Apparently, an inflated public awareness of 
income differences is a likely feature of the former, whereas the opposite is the latter.  
As a rough and ready assessment of this relationship, I examined the extent to which the 
average justice gaps for countries, E(Ji,G )s, are correlated with their inflated or deflated 
awareness of income differences. To this end, both Spearman and Pearson correlation 
coefficients were calculated between the justice gap and the sum of residuals across countries. 
They are .459* and .495* (N=20, p<.05), respectively. In that the range between .3 and .5 
suggests a medium level of correlation (Cohen 1988), it appears that the two measures assume a 
meaningful relationship. To further test its linear relationship, a regression analysis was carried 
out. In the regression, along with the mean value of the justice gap for each country, i.e., E(Ji,G ), 
I also incorporated the standard deviation of E(Ji,G ) for each country, assuming that E(Ji,G ) 
represents the strength of popular discontents with existing income distribution in a society and 
its standard deviation represents the overall homogeneity of its discontent
4
. On both E(Ji,G ) and 
its standard deviations, the sum of residuals is regressed. With R
2 
=.322 (see Table 7), the model 
itself is found significant. While the homogeneity measure does not explain variations in the sum 
of residuals between countries, the strength of the justice gap does have a significant influence 
on the discrepancies, with B of 19.023. This result, therefore, intuitive as it may be, hints at the 
possibility that when perceived injustice of the income distribution prevails in public opinion, an 
inflated public awareness of income inequality is likely to be observed.  
                                                 
4
 Hadler (2005) used the same operationalizations with means and standard deviations of measures to indicate, in his 
case, the strength and homogeneity of ideologies in individual country. 
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A similar inference was also deduced from comparing the E(Ji,G )s of two subgroups 
within each country, people who believed in large income difference in the society and those 
who did not.  For comparisons, in each nation, the E(Ji,G ) of respondents who agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement that income differences in their country are too large (TL, as shorthand) 
were contrasted to that of those who did not, including respondents who gave a neutral response 
(NTL, as shorthand). Results are intriguing. Looking at the details in Table 8, in all nations, the 
E(Ji,G ) of TL group is higher than that of NTL group with varying degrees of differences, 
ranging from .031 to .698. The smallest difference of .031 lies in New Zealand and the largest 
difference of .698 in Portugal. In Korea, the difference is .218. This finding clearly suggests that 
the justice gap, i.e., people’s perceived injustice of the income distribution in the society, makes 
a clear difference in appraising income differences in the society in such a way that the larger 
justice gap people perceive, the more likely they are to believe that income differences in the 
society are large. More importantly, when this difference indicates people’s different threshold of 
tolerance for unequal, if not unjust, distribution in the society, i.e., how large the justice gap must 
be in order for people to say that income differences are too large in their country, Korean 
people’s tolerance level does not seem to be high, given that the difference of .218 for Korea is 
only third largest of all (excluding New Zealand and Slovakia for their insignificant differences). 
From this, then, another feature of the Korean public’s views of income inequality is defined: not 
only do Koreans, as defined previously, see greater income inequality than is there and perceive 
a high level of injustice of the income distribution, but also Koreans hold a very low threshold of 
tolerance for unequal, if not unjust, distribution in a society.  
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So far, I have analyzed Korean views of inequality from a cross national perspective, and 
defined three characteristics. First, popular beliefs about large income differences of Korea, as 
contrasted with varying income inequality indices of other OECD countries, are far blown out of 
proportion, i.e., an inflated public awareness of income inequality; second, the perceived 
injustice of the income distribution in the society, as measured by the justice gap, is relatively 
strong in Korean public opinion; and, third, the threshold of public tolerance for unequal, if not 
unjust, distribution in the society is relatively low in Korea, given the small difference in the 
justice gaps between the NTL and TL groups.  The presence of a high level of perceived injustice 
of the income distribution in the society and a low tolerance for unequal, or unjust, distribution, 
coupled together, I suspect, may explain why there is such an inflated public awareness of 
income differences in Korea.  
Nonetheless, the extent to which an individual can endure inequality before one can say it 
is too unequal cannot be reduced a single dimension. Apart from his or her perceived legitimacy 
of income distribution in the society, other factors, e.g., age, social status, education, income 
level, and so on, can also influence with varying degrees the way he or she evaluates the level of 
inequality. Furthermore, evaluating inequality may not be just a matter of factuality; it may also 
involve evaluating its fairness within one’s scheme of distributive justice; hence, no isolation 
from ideological influences, either. Therefore, further explanations are required to better 
understand the Korean public’s perceptions of inequality. To this end, in the following chapters, 
I will introduce related theories and previous findings about perceptions of inequality, and 
discuss their implications in relation to the Korean public’s views of income inequality.  
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To briefly sketch out the two main theories to be discussed in the following chapters, 
students of social justice have demonstrated that what is considered to be a fair and tolerable 
range of inequality, namely people’s result-related judgment of distribution, is the product of 
both ideological and structural determinants (Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel, Mason and 
Wegener 1995; Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1999; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1962; 
Redmond, Schnepf and Suhrcke 2002; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000; Walster, Berscheid and 
Walster 1973; Wegener 1987a). The former approach, also known as the ideology thesis 
(Abercrombie and Turner 1978; Huber and Form 1973; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000; Wegener 
and Liebig 1995a), emphasizes a conceptually separated, but functionally connected relationship 
between the two modes of justice judgments: order-related and result-related judgments. 
According to Verwiebe and Wegener (2000), order-related judgements are about principles of 
justice and in particular the insitutional frame for distribution processes in a society (e.g., 
preferences for market principles versus a state regulated principles). Result-related judmgents, 
on the other hand, focus on the consequences of distribution rules. It measures the extent to 
which a given distribution is considered as just and tolerable. Thus, while order-relatedeness taps 
on individual preference for distributive princinples, result-relatedness taps on the justness of the 
results. Verwiebe and Wegener noted,  
From an analytical point of view, these ideological preferences (i.e., order-related) 
and the (result-related) justice evaluations of the income distribution are 
independent of each other. They address different justice objects: distribution 
principles and distribution results. Cognitively inconsistent as we are as human 
beings, our ideological preferences need not be in line with and may even 
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contradict our justice perceptions of results in concrete cases. It is nonetheless 
possible that order-related preferences may affect the evaluations of distribution 
results. The extent to which individuals perceive an actual income justice gap in 
their society, for instance, may well be contingent on their ideological preferences 
for distributing income and wealth. (P. 134) 
The key premise here is that our ideological preferences for certain distributive principles may 
become of enduring and central criteria in terms of which the fairness of distribution is 
evaluated and, consequently, our perceptions of inequality may change. Their relative 
endurance and stability as a determinant of justness evaluation and tolerance of inequality, 
according to Rokeach (1973), is derived from that fact that ideals and values are initially taught 
and learned in an absolute, all-or-none, manner; such-and-such a mode, we are taught, is 
desirable. It is the isolated and thus the absolute learning of values that more or less guarantees 
their endurance and stability as standards of judgment.  
This is why our mind is a “belief-seeking rather than a fact-seeking apparatus” 
(Murchison 1975). This trait of mind, also known as confirmation bias (Festinger 1957; Kunda 
1987; Kunda 1990; Kunda 1999; Plous 1993; Yaryan and Festinger 1961), is demonstrated, as 
people selectively gather or remember information that can be used to support their fundamental 
beliefs and interpret them in a biased way. Research has shown that not only is the effect of 
confirmation bias much stronger for the emotionally charged issues (income inequality in this 
case) and for the deeply entrenched beliefs (distributive ideals in this case), but also the bias 
contributes to overconfidence in personal beliefs and can maintain or strengthen beliefs in the 
face of contrary information (Kuklinski 2001; Kuklinski et al. 2000; Kuklinski et al. 1998). Thus, 
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our prescriptive beliefs, or justice ideologies in this case, do interact functionally with our 
judgment of inequality in reality in such a way that the former, when applicable, functions as a 
filter between the actual situation and the perception of it.  
Along with the ideology thesis, emphasis on structural determinants, i.e., people’ 
socioeconomic positions defined through structural hierarchy, has also been put forth by the 
structural position thesis. The thesis relates the development of individual attitudes toward 
inequality to self-interest considerations which are based on one’s position in the hierarchy. Of 
primary importance in this respect is social mobility. It has been demonstrated that the upward 
and downward movements associated with social mobility and personal appraisal of self-interest 
in it shape their judgments of inequality and its justness. Typically, people who locate 
themselves in the lower positions, due to their unfavorable material conditions, are more critical 
of inequality and show less tolerance of it than those who locate themselves at the upper end of 
society (Gijsberts 2002; Kelley and Evans 1993; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Verwiebe and 
Wegener 2000; Wegener 1991). This self interest-driven appraisal of inequality, according to the 
structural position thesis, explains that people see reality in ways that are consistent with his or 
her evaluations and expectations regarding material living conditions. The linkage between 
objective and subjective elements of inequality, thus, is mediated through self-interest 
calculations which are derived from person's structural location.  
While the two theses prioritize different determinants of perceptions of inequality in 
theory, it is important to note here that they in reality may not necessarily assume a mutually 
exclusive relationship and may well be complementary to each other for the common function 
they serve: they both provide people with systematic reference standards around which their 
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evaluations of inequality are constructed. Without such standards, there would not be a degree of 
commonality and predictability in people’s perception of inequality. Therefore, my analysis in 
the following does not claim nor purport to prove either theoretical superiority or practical 
exclusiveness of one thesis over the other as an explanation for the Korean public’s perception of 
income inequality; it only serves to demonstrate the relative, if any, importance of one 
determinant after the other is taken into account. Given notions, I examine, in the following two 
chapters, how the two determinants, justice ideals and stratification-related social experiences of 
individuals, affect subjective perceptions of income inequality in Korea. Chapter 3 focuses on 














CHAPTER 3. JUSTICE IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON PERCEPTION 
OF INEQUALITY 
3.1. IDEOLOGY THESIS  
 Perceptions of inequality, by nature, are subjective and relative to the extent that 
individuals resort to different points of comparison for making judgments. This, however, does 
not mean that all perceptions are merely arbitrary or random. Subjective as they may be, 
perceptions and evaluations of inequality are organized around certain reference standards (or 
structures), and thus reveal a degree of commonality and predictability. The influence of 
ideologies or norms regarding justice on the perception of social inequality has been of interest 
to many students of social justice study (Alwin, Gornev and Khakhulina 1995; Cohen 1982; 
Headey 1991b; Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1995; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Shepelak and 
Alwin 1986; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000; Wegener 1987a). The key premise of their initiative 
is that the subjective perception of inequality may have less to do with objective social facts, but 
more with value systems or ideologies regarding social justice that coexist with the structural 
conditions (Alwin, Gornev and Khakhulina 1995). Beyond actual inequality, they assume, other 
factors—in this case, the dominant justice ideology of society—would play a crucial role in 
shaping these perceptions.  
Of most relevance to the discussion is the dominant ideology thesis (Abercrombie, Hill 
and Turner 1980), an influential perspective which has shed light on ideology as the macro-level 
determinant of inequality beliefs. The thesis was originally devised in Marxist discourse in order 
to explain how a dominant class of a society maintains both material and mental dominance over 
the subordinated class through the control of ideological production. The thesis assumed that 
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Through its control of ideological production, the dominant class is able to 
supervise the construction of a set of coherent beliefs. These dominant beliefs of 
the dominant class are more powerful, dense, and coherent than those of the 
subordinate classes. The dominant ideology penetrates…the consciousness of the 
working class, because the working class comes to see and to experience reality 
through the conceptual categories of the dominant class. (P. 1) 
Yet, the notion of dominant ideology and its usage has been questioned in that, as critics have 
argued (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980; Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1990; Abercrombie 
and Turner 1978), the ideology of the ruling class has been, from a historical point of view, 
opposed by the class interests of the subordinate class, and, more importantly, it has not been 
available to the subordinate classes because it simply was not relevant to the everyday lives of 
the subordinated. The purpose of the ruling ideologies was rather to secure the coherence and 
legitimation of the ruling class itself. For reaching that goal, no other classes were necessary to 
participate in these ideologies. Therefore, the ideology of the ruling class is not the dominant 
ideology.   
To avoid the conceptual ambiguity linked to the notion of dominant ideology, Wegener 
and Liebig (1995a) introduced alternative concepts of primary and secondary ideologies to social 
justice research. By primary ideology, they meant an ideology that is held by the majority of a 
society, ideally by all of its members, whereas secondary ideology is an ideology endorsed only 
by particular groups in a society—possibly simultaneously with primary ideologies. The 
advantage of this conceptualization is that the concept of justice ideologies is no longer bound to 
a ruling class that forces the dominated into believing existing distribution to be just. Instead, 
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primary and secondary ideologies are simply distinguished in quantitative terms. The primary 
justice ideology, according to Wegener and Liebig, characterizes a whole society in a 
quantitative sense and serves as a mechanism to create an encompassing consensus in society 
and provide a basis for a society’s legitimization by exerting a normative influence on the beliefs 
that most, or even all, people have about how goods should be distributed. These justice beliefs, 
they argued, reflect the cultural values characterizing the society in which those beliefs are 
anchored, and therefore, can be reconstructed by going back to the cultural values that have 
developed in a society’s history.  
 Whether we experience and see economic inequality through the ideological lenses of the 
dominant class or the cultural history of a society, the key premise I set forth here is that such 
justice values that people hold, namely what ought to be, influence the subjective elements of 
perceptions of inequality, namely what is. Should our views of what is deserved or fair be 
essentially defined, if not filtered, through the ideals of distributive justice, then, our normative 
stance toward distributive justice can be positioned along the ideological continuum, where the 
far right end is justice norms favoring self-interest and individualistic reward system, also known 
as the meritocratic market justice norms and beliefs, whereas the far left end is justice norms 
favoring egalitarian statism, also known as the socialist justice norms and beliefs.  
According to Lane (1986), meritocratic norms of and beliefs about inequality represent 
the key features of “market justice.” Market justice, per his definition, is a set of norms and 
beliefs about economic order that serves to legitimize capitalism in public opinion. Amongst all, 
the key market justice norms involve preferences for the inegalitarian criterion of earned deserts 
over the criteria of equality and need, and for limited or no government direction of the economy. 
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The key market justice beliefs concern the availability of economic opportunity and equity in the 
distribution. These beliefs, Lane assumed, should buttress commitment to market justice norms, 
since people judge the fairness of inequality in the market in terms of opportunity and equity of 
the economic outcome. If the public perceives that such conditions hold, resulting inequality 
becomes tolerable because it is thought to further productivity and contribute to collective gains. 
Therefore, open opportunity and equitable distribution (or perceptions of them, at least) 
constitute, as Lane noted, the must-be-met procedural requirements for the market to be judged 
fair.  
Under socialist justice discourse, on the other hand, norms of and beliefs about inequality 
are unlike those of market justice. As Marx’s slogans, “From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs” and “The theory of the Communism may be summed up in the 
single sentence: Abolition of private property” (1970) indicate, state socialist justice ideology 
does not approve of the justice of the meritocratic criterion of earned deserts. Instead, the criteria 
of need and equality are prioritized, since it is believed that only after the material lacks which 
cause suffering disappear can human beings exhibit their full potential and live together in 
harmony as a creative social entity and pursuing genuine happiness. Thus, in the face of social 
inequality, the strong redistributing state is called upon to restore the balance.  
Depending on the justice ideologies prevailing, therefore, varying degrees of tolerance 
for inequality may well occur. When the majority of society supports meritocratic distributive 
justice ideals over other distributive ideals, economic inequality in the society, e.g., income 
differences, is more likely to be tolerated and taken for granted. More tolerance of a greater 
range of inequality encourages individuals to perceive the level of income differences as being 
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lower than it actually is. In contrast, when support for egalitarian justice norms prevails among 
the majority, then, an opposite pattern of perceived inequality of society is probable, to the extent 
that the limited tolerance for inequality motivates people to describe income differences as being 
larger than they are. Findings from previous research directly and indirectly hint at this 
congruency between the distributive norms and their psychological effects on subjective 
perceptions of inequality. Headey (1991b), for instance, compared actual incomes of selected 
occupations in Australia with both perceived incomes and incomes regarded as legitimate and 
discovered that most respondents grossly misperceived the actual income distribution and 
erroneously equated perceived incomes with legitimate incomes. These results, Headey argued, 
might well be attributable to the popular egalitarian justice sentiments among the Australian 
public and people’s desire to avoid a sense of personal deprivation or social injustice. That is, 
public support for a greater degree of income equality than in fact existed facilitated a 
corresponding increase in the discrepancy between actual, on the one hand, and perceived and 
legitimate incomes, on the other; and in line with the social psychological theory of cognitive 
dissonance (Aronson 1968; Festinger 1957; Greenwald and Ronis 1978; Mills and Harmon-
Jones 1999), which holds that people subconsciously bring their perceptions of what is into line 
with what ought to be in order to reduce unpleasant dissonance, respondents’ desire to construct 
a picture of economic reality that enabled them to feel reasonably satisfied with their own 
economic lot within the society induced them to level off differences between perceived and 
legitimate incomes. Following the speculations above, Headey concluded 
It should not be assumed that public perceptions of the distribution of social 
goods are even remotely accurate, and a normative standard of equality appears 
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systematically to distort perceptions of reality. What ought to be largely 
influences perceptions of what is, rather vice versa. Perceptions of justice 
determine perceptions of fact. (P. 593) 
Similarly, Austen (1999) discussed cross-country variations in public attitudes toward earning 
inequality in reference to justice norms, and argued for the importance of prevailing norms of 
inequality in societies as an explanation for the variations demonstrated. According to her, 
differential material environments between countries rendered only a partial explanation, and 
other factors should be taken into account. She argued 
Despite this, significant intra- and inter-country differences in attitudes to wage 
inequality exist that cannot be explained by the different economic circumstances 
of individuals or nations. It appears that some countries, such as the United States, 
have social “norms” that tolerate relatively high levels of inequality, while the 
citizens of other countries, such as Australia, generally share a belief that the 
wage structure should be more compressed. Thus, an important dynamic 
relationship appears to exist between levels of inequality and the normative 
structures that relate to them. (Pp. 441-442) 
In a country like the United States, despite the rapid increases in wage inequality in fact, people 
showed a greater range of tolerance to inequality than in other countries, and Austen attributed it 
to the community’s compliance with “market-based pressures,” namely, acceptance of the justice 
of inequality in the market. Indeed, copious opinion research in the United States (Feagin 1975; 
Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1959; Lane 1953; Lane 1962; Lane 1986; Lipset 1979; McClosky 
and Zaller 1984b; Williamson 1974a; Williamson 1974b; Williamson 1974c; Williamson 1976) 
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has demonstrated robust tolerance to inequality among the American public, e.g., opposition to 
welfare programs and stigmatization of the poor for their poverty, and scholars ascribed such 
attitudes to Americans’ commitment to meritocratic justice ideologies; that is, prevailing 
meritocratic justice norms, or strong rejection of material egalitarianism, buttressed popular 
belief in the benefits of inequality, and rendered people tolerant of poverty and income inequality, 
and intolerant of welfare programs (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1986). 
It is hypothesized, therefore, that an inflated awareness of income differences and a high 
level of perceived injustice of income distribution among the Korean public is more contingent 
on Koreans’ ideological preferences for egalitarian, rather than meritocratic, distribution of 
income and wealth. In the following, I introduce previous findings on the Korean public’s justice 
sentiments, define its nature in terms of the general norms of distributive justice, and draw out its 
implications for the inflated public awareness of inequality. 
3.2. POPULAR NORMS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY OF KOREA: KOREANS’ 
BELIEFS ABOUT THE NORMS OF JUST DISTRIBUTION 
 Given that justice is essentially a matter of establishing a fair equilibrium of distribution 
of desired goods and undesired ills between individuals, an important normative question of 
distributive justice arises when one tries to decide what the relevant characteristics of distribution 
should be. That is, by virtue of what attributes or characteristics is each person’s due to be 
decided? As controversy has abounded among the normative theorists of justice over the 
question, empirical studies of public opinion have demonstrated the diversity of lay beliefs about 
distributive norms. Such pluralistic beliefs about justice, as Miller (1992) stressed, may occur as 
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people invoke several criteria of distribution and reach an overall judgment by balancing these 
criteria against each other.  
While a varying number of general principles of distributive justice have been put 
forward in many theories of justice, the following three norms—equity (or desert), equality, and 
need—have been most widely recognized as the main principles of distributive justice, and lay 
beliefs about justice have been analyzed in light of them. First, the principle of equity, also 
known as the principle of desert or merit, assumes that the only fair way of allocating benefits 
and burdens between individuals is to ensure that each gets the share he deserves according to his 
desert, or contribution (Berkowitz and Hatfield 1976; Rotemberg 1996; Sadurski 1985; Sher 
1987; Soltan 1987). Those who contribute more should get proportionally more than those who 
contribute less. If the relative ratio of contribution to share is unequally maintained for the 
individuals involved in a given distribution, then justice is violated. In other words, unequal 
distribution per se is not unjust under the principle of equity; injustice, instead, occurs, when 
people who are not equal are assigned equal shares. By this logic, the principle of equity, or 
desert, reflects the meritocratic discourse of distributive justice. 
The basic contention of the meritocratic justice approach is that justice must be able to 
identify and connect reasons for differential treatment that results in inequality. That is, justice 
requires treating like persons alike, not all persons alike. The moral justification of differential, 
or unequal, treatment of individuals in the meritocratic justice discourse, however, does not 
result from the premise of the unequal worth of all human beings. On the contrary, the discourse 
assumes that each individual, as a responsible sentient creature, is equally worthy in his 
experience and action, and is equally entitled to pursue his own happiness. Thus, whatever 
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choices each individual makes, as long as the choice is dictated by deliberate free will, it is just 
for individuals to assume a corresponding responsibility for their own conduct and to be treated 
accordingly.  
On this account, Sadurski (1985), a renowned champion of the principle of desert, 
defined three unique features of desert that other principles lacked: it is person-oriented, value-
laden, and past-oriented. The principle of desert is person-oriented, in the sense that it is always 
attributed to persons for their free will-based choice; it is value-laden, in the sense that it 
inevitably involves the assessment of the social consequences of one’s choice; and it is past-
oriented, in the sense that the evaluation is only applicable to actions that already have taken 
place. It is clear that the principle is not concerned with the moral worth of an individual per se; 
instead, only the individual’s socially valuable effort that accompanies sacrifice, work, risk, 
responsibility, inconvenience, and so forth counts. Thus, all those features that are unduly earned, 
that are without human choice and intervention, and for which the person cannot claim any credit 
are eliminated. In addition, it successfully accommodates two contradictory concepts—equal 
worth and unequal worthiness of human beings—without one refuting the other. On the one hand, 
it champions the idea of equal worth of individuals by treating them as equally important and 
responsible moral agents; on the other hand, it justifies the idea of unequal worthiness of human 
beings by holding them responsible for their own conduct and promising that which is due to 
them by virtue of their conduct.   
The principle of equality, just like the principle of equity, or desert, draws upon the same 
premise of the equal divine worthiness of each individual. Each person, as a responsible sentient 
creature, is equally worthy in his experience and action, and is equally entitled to pursue one’s 
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own happiness. The two principles, however, stand apart, as the premise of equal worthiness in 
the egalitarian justice discourse extends beyond the moral worth of an individual; it further 
requires equality of outcomes regardless of relative distributions and inputs (Greenberg and 
Cohen 1982). Equal shares in the distribution of outcome are supported, because individual 
distinctions based on generalized, situationally irrelevant, and evaluative comparisons of people 
run a risk of leading to the total neglect of an individual or a group of people by denying an 
entitlement to be considered merely as men of equal moral worth, regardless of their conduct or 
choices. Accordingly, economic egalitarianism stresses the limitations on income and 
hierarchical differences with the purpose of keeping individual distinctions to a minimum. This 
is achieved either by raising a wage floor, which ensures that everyone receive a decent 
minimum, or by suppressing the ceiling so that no one exceeds the limit, or both.  
Finally, the principle of need constitutes another widely recognized distributive principle. 
According to Campbell (2001), the language of need is distinguished from equity (or desert) and 
equality, in the sense that it is subject to a teleological interpretation; that is, pursuing need per se 
is not an ultimate end state of distribution, but a precondition for real human fulfillment. As 
Marx himself acknowledged, meeting basic needs is of great importance, not only because 
neglect of them generates great suffering, but also because the manner in which a society goes 
about satisfying the material needs of its members determines everything else. This is why, in the 
communitarian context, need as a principle of justice dictates that resources be directed toward 
eliminating human suffering. Only after the material deficiencies that cause suffering disappear 
can human beings reach their full potential, and live together in harmony as a creative social 
entity and pursue genuine happiness. Rawls (1972) argued that the worst-off group in society be 
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given priority, and thus enjoy the self-respect that comes from the possession of equal political 
rights and the material assistance that is necessary for them to develop their abilities to the same 
level as those of similar ability; and that, to this end, the whole economic system should be 
directed to ensure that the marginalized are not excluded from the benefits of increased wealth. 
Similarly, Galston (1980) stressed the principle of need as the means required for the attainment 
of urgent ends that are widely, if not universally, desired. Whether for the maintenance of one’s 
life or for the adequate development of one’s capability, he argued, one’s need, particularly, 
natural need, must be met with a moral priority, and the society assumes a duty to help those in 
need or in jeopardy, so long as it does not entail excessive loss or risk to others. 
In sum, some similarities and differences between the three principles are noteworthy. On 
the one hand, they are similar to the extent that they all draw upon the common moral axiom of 
equal worthiness of individuals, according to which each person, as a responsible sentient 
creature, is equally worthy in his experience and action, and is equally entitled to pursue his own 
happiness. They are different, on the other hand to the extent that they disagree with the 
justification for differential treatment that results in inequality. The desert- or equity-based 
meritocratic justice discourse finds its ground for unequal treatment of individuals in the moral 
axiom of equal worthiness of individuals, in the sense that all individuals, since they are viewed 
as equally free-willed agents who can intentionally intervene in natural events through their own 
choice and intention, should be accountable for the consequences they have brought up. As a 
result, those who contribute more should get proportionately more than those who contribute less.  
Unlike this meritocratic justice discourse, both the equality- and need-based justice 
approaches refute the moral justification of treatment that results in inequality. Their aversion to 
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distinctions between individuals turns a blind eye to generalized, situationally irrelevant, and 
evaluative comparisons of people, and thus defines economic fairness as a condition where more 
individuals, ideal-typically all individuals, have an equal claim, regardless of their relative inputs 
and contributions, to the social benefits that afford them real human fulfillment, not simply the 
mere satisfaction of instant desires. Therefore, the principle of desert, or equity, and the principle 
of equality may well make up two extreme ends of a continuum of justice ideology, where the 
two stand for the most meritocratic and egalitarian nature, respectively. Between the two 
extremes, the principle of need, due to its moral emphasis on the egalitarian way of guaranteeing 
social and material needs for everyone, shares more commonality with the principle of equality 
than with that of equity.  
Returning to the inflated public perceptions of income differences in Korea, I 
hypothesized earlier that the phenomenon, coupled with a high level of perceived injustice of 
income distribution, is driven by strong egalitarian justice sentiments among the public. Findings 
from the early opinion research in Korea, however, appear to suggest that Koreans are not so 
equality-oriented. Jung and Siegel (1985), for instance, explored popular perceptions of 
distributive justice of Korea in 1981. In their research, a sample of 302 adult respondents 
residing urban and rural areas in Korea was selected and interviewed. Most respondents did not 
consider egalitarianism, or the principle of equality, as a just criterion for economic distribution; 
instead, people supported a strong meritocratic principle of distributive justice, by choosing 
occupational and educational attainments, work experience, and capital investment as the major 
criteria for distribution. While individual need, or the principle of need, was found to be 
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important for distribution, desert-based distribution of individual earnings was a dominant 
criterion. They concluded 
In short, there are some variations in the structure of judgments of income-
fairness due to the levels of capital-input and occupational prestige of respondents. 
However, the differences appeared only in the priorities among merit 
considerations (i.e., length of employment, occupation, and capital input, etc.), not 
in the priorities between merit and need. (P. 430) 
Similarly, Son (1992; 1997) explored perceptions of and attitudes toward fair 
compensation among the Korean employees in 1991 and 1995, where samples of 2,142 and 699 
were selected and surveyed, respectively. In both surveys, respondents were presented with 
various distributive criteria (i.e., work experience, educational and professional attainments, 
gender, age, achievement, and the number of family to support
5
) and asked to rate their 
subjective support for each.
6
 In the 1991 survey, he found that respondents, for the most part, 
approved of income differences based on equity-related criteria of distribution, i.e., the longer 
one’s work experience and the better one’s educational and professional attainments, the more 
compensation the person deserved, whereas non-equity-related considerations such as gender 
and age did not receive as much support. Given the findings, Son (1992) suggested  
The results indicate that people in general believe that distributions based on 
equity principles, namely, unequal rewards in proportion to individual inputs such 
as personal qualification, work experience, and educational attainments, are more 
                                                 
5
 The criterion of achievement did not appear in the 1991 survey, and was added to the 1995 survey. In contrast, the 
criterion of the number of family to support appeared in the 1991 survey, and was omitted in the 1995 survey.  
6
 For reference, the 1991 and 1995 survey results that Son referred to in his analysis were reconstructed in Figures 
19 and 20.  
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legitimate than those based on alternative considerations such as age, gender, and 
the number of family to support, which speak to the principles of need or equality. 
(P. 234)  
The 1995 survey results, according to Son, did not show noticeable differences in respondents’ 
supports for equity principles, in the sense that most respondents in the 1995 survey also 
believed that the longer one’s work experience and the better one’s professional attainments and 
performance at work, the more shares the person deserved. In addition, support for non-equity 
related considerations such as age and gender were even lower in the 1995 survey. After 
comparing the two survey findings, Son (1997) suggested 
Overall, the proportions of respondents who showed obvious attitudes toward the 
criteria (i.e., either support or opposition) have decreased and those who took 
neutral attitudes (i.e., neither disagree nor agree) have increased markedly 
between the two surveys. However, wage differences based on equity 
considerations have been most popularly supported, and this may reflect popular 
expectations of replacing widespread seniority system with the piece rate system 
in companies. (P. 247) 
Park (2005) also drew similar conclusions on the popular consciousness of equality in 
Korea from his analysis of opinion research conducted by Sok et al. (1997; 2005a) in 1995 and 
2000, where samples of 1865 and 1858, respectively, were selected and surveyed. In both 
surveys, respondents were asked to evaluate whether individuals were responsible for their own 
economic fates, in the sense that those who lagged behind should blame themselves and those 
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who became poor did so because they did not work hard enough.
 7
 He found that 55.3% and 51.3% 
of the respondents in the 1995 and 2000 surveys, respectively, agreed with an idea that those 
who lagged behind should blame themselves, not the social system. Similarly, he found that 
more respondents in both surveys agreed that individual poverty was attributable to personal 
indolence, not to external factors. According to Park, these results might well reflect the 
prevalence of individualist and capitalist values among the Korean public; that is, in the sense 
that people believed that personal effort and diligence led to success and that individual failure 
was attributable to personal responsibility, not to society, the principal distributive principle of 
Korea might well speak to equity, not equality and need. 
Overall, previous discussion of popular distributive justice sentiment of Korea has 
demonstrated, directly or indirectly, that Koreans in general supported market justice norms, in 
the sense that desert- or equity-based meritocratic justice principles were more preferred to 
equality- and need-based egalitarian justice norms. This finding, however, contradicts what 
Western scholars earlier claimed about the Korean public’s justice attitude toward equality 
(Brandt 1987; Brandt 1991; Leipziger et al. 1992; Nelson 2000), according to which Koreans 
strongly upheld egalitarian justice norms of distribution. Moreover, should market justice norms 
of inequality, as alleged by previous research, have prevailed among the Korean public, then, 
Korea would have shown a deflated, instead of inflated, popular awareness of income differences 
in my foregoing analysis; that is, as is the case in American public opinion, popular support for 
meritocratic justice norms and high tolerance of inequality which results from it should have 
encouraged Koreans to see existing income differences as less problematic, if not normal.  
                                                 
7
 For reference, the 1995 and 2000 survey results that Park referred to in his analysis were reconstructed in Figures 
21 and 22.  
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In addition, the following survey results may well challenge the alleged popular support 
for meritocratic justice norms of inequality in Korea. In the 1995 opinion survey by Sok et al. 
(1997), for example, respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which reducing economic 
inequality in Korea was important, and the extent to which the government was responsible for 
it.
8
 They found that 94.1% of the respondents indicated that reducing economic inequality was an 
important agenda of Korea, and that 92.3% indicated that the government should assume 
responsibility for reducing income inequality. Likewise, in the 2000 opinion survey by Sok et al. 
(2005b), respondents were asked to evaluate the extent which Korean society needed economic 
reform for an equal distribution and whether government should help the poor get out of 
poverty.
9
 They found that 79.4% of the respondents agreed that economic reform for an equal 
distribution was necessary for Korea, and that 59.7% agreed that government should help the 
poor with their poverty.   
In the foregoing theoretical and empirical discussion on market, or meritocratic, justice 
norms, government intervention in the economy by leveling incomes or ensuring income floor as 
such was principally discouraged, since such forced measures arbitrarily interfere with the 
equilibrium of distribution by allowing some individuals to get more than they deserved, while 
others would receive less, relative to their contributions (or inputs). Besides, many opinion 
studies empirically have demonstrated a strong tie between belief in market justice norms and 
attitudes toward government intervention in public opinion, where the stronger the public 
support for meritocratic justice norms, the stronger the public opposition to government 
interventions. The survey results for Korea above, where the vast majority of people emphasized 
                                                 
8
 For reference, the 1995 survey results that Sok et al. referred to were reconstructed in Figure 23.  
9
 For reference, the 2000 survey results that Sok et al. referred to were reconstructed in Figure 24.  
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the necessity of both an egalitarian distributive reform and government’s supporting the poor, 
apparently disagree with the key theoretical and empirical discourses of market justice ideology. 
They rather reflect the key characteristics of egalitarian distributive ideals, and better support the 
hypothesis I set forth above regarding the role of egalitarian distributive ideals in crafting a high 
level of perceived income inequality among Koreans.     
Given the ambiguities in the interpretation of the popular justice sentiment of Korea, I 
reexamined Korean people’s distributive justice preferences, namely, ‘what ought to be,’ with 
the 1999/2003 ISSP survey data from a comparative perspective. As introduced above, the ISSP 
survey is one of few systematic international surveys that offer comparable perspectives on 
public beliefs about inequality between countries for its procedural and instrumental 
comparability in data collection. Comparing the survey results of Korea with those of other 
OECD counterparts in the data, therefore, provides a better referential structure on which the 
interpretation of popular distributive justice norms among the Korean public can be built, and, 
accordingly, the interpretative ambiguities which came from the lack of comparable reference 
groups in previous research of justice beliefs of Korea can be redressed as well.  
3.2.1. MEASURES  
 To distinguish respondents’ preference for merit-based distribution (i.e., meritocratic 
distributive norms) from non-merit based one (i.e., egalitarian distributive norms), the following 
four questions were selected from the 1999/2003 ISSP surveys. 
 In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should (How much 
responsibility goes with the job) be? 
  In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should (Whether the job 
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requires supervising others) be? 
  In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should (What is needed to 
support a family) be?  
  In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should (Whether the person 
has children to support) be? 
The first two questions are used to assess the extent to which merit-based distributive criteria are 
supported by the respondent, while the last two to assess the extent to which nonmerit-based, or 
egalitarian, distributive criteria are supported by the respondent. As I have discussed above, the 
key premise of meritocratic distributive ideology lies in the equity; namely, for a distribution to 
be fair, rewards should be made among individuals in proportion to their work-related merits. 
For a person at a managerial position, therefore, to be more compensated than the rank-and-file, 
for his or her more responsibilities and burdens at work, is, in light of the equity-based 
evaluation, is legitimate and just. Emphasizing family and children, on the contrary, violates 
such an equity-based equilibrium, since it intentionally neglects any of individual’s work-related 
merits, and put irrelevant characteristics in their place. Given that such decisions are more of 
need-based, I used these questions to assess respondent’s preference for egalitarian distributive 
measures. A similar operationalization of indicators to measure people’s sentiments toward 
meritocratic and egalitarian distributive ideologies is found in previous research. Kluegel and 
Mateju (1995), for instance, used survey questions in the ISJP
10
 that asked respondents the 
importance of family size in determining the level of pay for an employee to assess their 
egalitarian sentiments. Similarly, Mason (1995) used the same family size question to measure, 
                                                 
10
 The International Social Justice Project (ISJP) is a collaborative effort among 13 countries to conduct a 
comparative study of popular perceptions of economic and social justice in advanced industrialized nations. 
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in his operationalization, people’s support for socialist distributive principles. Elsewhere, 
Kluegel et al. (1999) used a survey statement in the ISJP that related the necessity of extra pay 
for people to take extra responsibility at work as a measure for respondent’s adherence to 
capitalist (i.e., meritocratic), as opposed to egalitarian, principles. Therefore, my 
operationalizations with the four questions from the ISSP survey here serve the same function as 
theirs, tapping on people’s meritocratic and egalitarian distributive ideologies.   
For analysis, the original five-point response scale, (1=essential, 2=very important, 
3=fairly important, 4=not very important, and 5=not important at all), was reversed. At an 
individual level, the combined mean of the first two questions was used to measure the strength 
of individual support for merit-based distributive justice ideologies (MDJI, as shorthand) and the 
combined mean of the latter two for the strength of egalitarian distributive justice ideologies 
(EDJI, as shorthand).  At a national level, too, the aggregated mean and its standard deviation 
were used to indicate the strength and homogeneity of popular support for either distributive 
ideology in the society, respectively, for cross-national comparisons.  
3.2.2. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 The means and standardized deviations of the EDJI and MDJI for countries are 
summarized in Table 9. With respect to the EDJI, different strength of the EDJI is noted between 
countries. Of all, Spain and Germany reveal the strongest preference for the EDJI with the means 
of 3.752 and 3.616, respectively. Following them, France and Korea show third and fourth 
highest means of 3.580 and 3.572, respectively. In contrast, interestingly enough, the two Nordic 
countries, Denmark and Sweden, are associated with the smallest means of 2.650 and 2.778, 
respectively, indicating that popular sentiments toward the EDJI in these nations are weaker than 
68 
 
those of almost all other OECD countries. Considering how extensively people in those counties 
benefit from the core welfare policies and meet their needs, this finding is quite baffling. In terms 
of the homogeneity of the EDJI, all three Nordic countries again show a relatively weak 
homogeneity. The two highest levels of homogeneity, on the other hand, are found in Spain and 
Germany. Not only did they have the strongest support for the EDJI, but also the overall 
homogeneity among the citizens for their supports for the EDJI is high. In case of Korea, the 
level of homogeneity is fifth highest, also indicating that public preference for the EDJI in Korea 
is relatively homogenous. Overall, countries with a higher strength of the EDJI are also 
characterized by a higher level of homogeneity (a negative correlation, r, of -.48* (p<.05) 
between the two measures). From the comparisons above, therefore, it is apparent that in Korea 
not only is public support for the EDJI strong, but also public consensus on the legitimacy of the 
EDJI as a distributive norm is pervasive.   
With regard to the MDJI, a fairly high level of strength and homogeneity is observed 
across countries. Unlike the EDJI, where the global mean and standard deviation of which for 
twenty counties are 3.243 and 1.053, the same measures for the MDJI are 3.742 and .669, 
respectively. This suggests that across countries people’s justice sentiments toward the MDJI do 
not vary as much as they do toward the EDJI. With minor variations between countries, 
nonetheless, Portugal marks the highest strength of 3.999, followed by New Zealand (3.915) and 
United States (3.911). In contrast, Japan has the lowest mean of 3.452. Following Japan, Korea 
has second lowest mean of 3.461, indicating that popular support for merit-based distribution in 
both countries is weaker than that of other countries. Another interesting observation is that the 
three Nordic nations, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, are all clustered into the bottom tier, with 
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the means of 3.636, 3.650, and 3.666, respectively. This finding seems to offset the baffling 
disagreement that I pointed out above with regard to the weak strength of the EDJI in those 
countries, especially in Denmark and Sweden; despite their strong welfare orientations, that 
popular sentiment toward the EDJI was not conspicuous did not seem to fit the reality; however, 
here, such disagreement appears to be counterbalanced, as the two countries (and Denmark) are 
characterized by the low strength of the MDJI. A possible explanation for this would be that the 
strong welfare orientations in these countries are more manifested in the form of opposition to, if 
not weak support for, the MDJI, but less in the form of aggressive support for the EDJI. As was 
the case with the EDJI, a fairly consistent relationship between the strength and homogeneity of 
the MDJI is also detected across countries, where r=-.477* (p<.05), i.e., countries with a higher 
strength of the MDJI are also characterized by a higher level of homogeneity of it. The 
homogeneity of the MDJI of Korea marks only six highest from the bottom and, thus, 
corresponds to its low strength. 
What is further noted here is the relative difference in the strength between the EDJI and 
the MDJI within a nation. While the magnitude of difference (most of them found significant, 
at .05 level) is varying across countries, ranging from -.141 to 1.001, only in two nations, Korea 
and Spain, a different pattern is observed than is in other countries: while in the rest the strength 
of the MDJI is higher than that of the EDJI, only in Korea and Spain, the opposite is observed. 
The strength of the EDJI is more conspicuous than that of the MDJI in both nations. Apparently, 
in the two countries the EDJI serves as a more crucial scheme of justice than the MDJI. This 
difference, however, should not be read into absolute terms; that is, a negative difference in the 
strength between the two ideologies in Korea and Spain does not mean that people in both 
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countries disapprove any meritocratic distributive norms and adhere to egalitarian distributive 
ideals alone. Looking at the positive correlations between the two strengths of the EDJI and 
MDJI in Korea and Spain, .242 and .381, respectively, and in most other nations as well, it is 
apparent that the two ideologies do not necessarily assume a zero-sum relationship in people’s 
justice scheme in fact.  
In the earlier discussion of the theories of justice ideologies, I highlighted incompatible 
viewpoints on the justice of inequality that the MDJI and the EDJI project. Should people’s 
justice beliefs in reality indeed be in line with such theoretical discourses and, therefore, a zero-
sum relationship between the two distributive ideologies hold, i.e., supporting for one ideology 
inevitably suppresses the other, we would have observed negative, rather than positive, 
correlations like in France. To this seemingly contradictory state of justice beliefs in public 
opinion, scholars have introduced the theory of split-consciousness for explanations (Cheal 1979; 
Halle 1984; Hochschild 1981; Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1995; 
Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1962). The split-consciousness perspective assumes that people’s 
justice beliefs are compartmentalized, in Lane’s expression (1962), rarely encompassing and 
consistent; that is, people would endorse more than one, and even contradictory ideologies, to 
form their beliefs about inequality. The key proposition of the theory is that the two bodies of 
beliefs, one being primary and the other being secondary, might well coexist without either 
threatening to transform the other. That is, they would simply occupy separate places in an 
individual’s consciousness, and remain compartmentalized. For this reason, the theory argues 
that people might rarely, if ever, bring them together in their consciousness; thus, they never 
would activate a potential challenge. Using the theory, Kluegel and Smith (1986), for instance, 
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explained the duality of justice beliefs among the American public, where a majority 
acknowledged the justice of economic inequality in the market, while a substantial portion of 
people also preferred to take egalitarian measures to reduce inequality. These challenging beliefs 
were clearly inconsistent with the principle market justice norms of and beliefs about inequality 
which have characterized the macro-level justice ethos of America.  
In light of the theory of split-consciousness, then, the primary distributive ideology in 
Korea is defined in terms of the EDJI, whereas the secondary in terms of the MDJI. Given 
classifications, then, for the two justice norms to assume a positive relationship in the Korean 
public’s justice consciousness should not be seen as a paradox. Of relevance here is how the two 
primary and secondary distributive justice ideologies translate into Koreans’ perceptions of 
income differences. In the following, I will answer this question.  
3.3. TRANSLATING JUSTICE IDEOLOGIES INTO PERCEPTIONS OF INCOME 
DIFFERENCES: HOW DO THEY WORK IN KOREA? 
 The focus here is to examine the relationship between existential beliefs about inequality 
and moral standards of just distribution. Given that the subjective element of perceptions of 
social inequality may have less to do with objective social facts than ideologies and value 
systems regarding distributive justice, to what extent do Koreans’ perceptions of income 
differences vary due to their justice ideologies?   
3.3.1. MEASURES  
 For the dependent variable, the following survey question from the 2003 Korean ISSP 
survey was used.  
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 Do you agree or disagree… 
Differences in income in [your country] are too large.   
Respondents specified their level of agreement to the statement, using a five-point scale—
‘strongly agree,’ ‘agree,’ ‘neither disagree nor agree,’ ‘disagree,’ and ‘strongly disagree.’ In my 
analysis, the first category was contrasted to the rest in logistic regression. This partition was 
necessary, since in Korea 54.4 % of respondents lay within the first category, and 93.3 % within 
the first two categories. Therefore, for operationalizations, the first category was defined as a 
group of people who genuinely perceive income differences in the society as too large, whereas 
the rest as a group of people who do not deem income differences as serious (at least not as 
serious as those in the first category).   
The strength of individual support for the two distributive justice ideologies, i.e., the 
EDJI and the MDJI, used the same measure from the previous section (see section 3.2.1.). Here, I 
only considered the Korean respondents’. In addition, the justice gap was also introduced as a 
determinant of perceptions of income differences. This concept, as explained at length earlier, 
measures how much injustice people perceive in current income distribution in the society. The 
larger the gap, the more discontent he or she is with existing economic order. Of relevance here 
is that such discontent, as it is derived from his or her scheme of reward justice, may facilitate a 
pessimistic, or negative in this case, appraisal of income inequality, encouraging people to see 
more inequalities than are there. Given assumptions, it is hypothesized that people who see a 
large justice gap in the society are more likely to perceive income differences of Korea as too 
large than those who do not. 
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For socio-demographic characteristics of individuals, the following factors—age, gender, 
income and occupation, and education level—were considered for the following rationales. First, 
the idea that age determines one’s income inequality perception is derived from the thesis of the 
determining force of socialization. In discussing demographic differences in what pay people 
think legitimate across countries, Kelley and Evans (1993) found that age created a different 
level of income inequality tolerance, where older respondents were more in favor of paying 
higher salaries for elite occupations than younger ones, while little difference was found for low-
status occupations. Such generational differences in income inequality tolerance toward high pay 
jobs, according to them, could be attributed to the steady value shifts in the developed world 
toward the social and political left, or “equalitarian zeitgeist,” since World War II. More 
egalitarian preferences about earnings among the young respondents than among the older 
respondents, they speculated, might well be the part of this value shift, i.e., the outcome of its 
socialization. If this trend is also true for Korea, the younger respondents are more likely to 
perceive income differences in Korea as too large than the older ones. For comparisons, 
respondents are grouped into six age groups, ‘18-29,’ ‘30-39,’ ‘40-49,’ ‘50-59,’ ‘60-69,’ and ‘70 
or higher’.     
As for gender, research has shown a gender-driven difference in perceptions of social 
justice. Gilligan (1982), for instance, argued that women, compared to men, develop a very 
different justice perception due to their caring nature. Women, according to her, due to their 
caring nature, do not seek an objectively fair or just resolution to moral dilemmas; instead, their 
moral reasoning is firmly rooted in an ethics of responsibility (or care) and, thus, is differentiated 
from a formal and abstract mode of thinking (i.e., ethics of right). Women who reach the highest 
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level of this moral reasoning, she claimed, attain an extended view of equality. Her argument that 
women prefer egalitarianism was empirically tested by Davidson, Steinmann and Wegener 
(1995), and they found that women’s socialization into patriarchal culture causes women to 
spurn distributive measures based on competitive or achievement-oriented values. Given 
explanations, in my analysis, gender-driven difference in perceptions of income difference is 
tested.  
 As for income and occupation, studies have shown that perceptions of reward hierarchies 
are relative to an observer’s location within these hierarchies (Evans, Kelley and Kolosi 1992; 
Wegener 1987a). The position that people occupy in the hierarchy systematically distorts 
people’s definition of the inequality situation, which in turn determines people’s attitudes (or 
tolerance) toward inequality. The way this works is that people most accurately perceive incomes 
close to themselves, whereas the farther an occupation is from their own, the less people can 
perceive this accurately. For this reason, people are inclined to pull the range of incomes towards 
their own level. People with low income occupations may be expected to underestimate high 
incomes and, thus, perceive less income inequality than people with high incomes. In the view of 
high earners, in contrast, the income distribution will be shifted upwards, i.e., larger income 
differences. To examine if the same polarization/leveling effect based on occupational hierarchy 
is also true for Korean respondents’ perceptions of income inequality, respondents’ occupations 
were, following Kelley and Evans’s classification (1993), grouped into three hierarchical tiers: 
the top tier is comprised of professional and administrative managers, the second tier is clerical 
and sales, and the bottom is traditional blue collar workers, agricultural/forestry/fishery workers, 
and never worked. As for income, to better assess respondent’s position in income hierarchy in 
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reality, reported household incomes are used for identification. For comparisons, household 
incomes were stratified into five hierarchical tiers, where the upper limit of each tier was defined 
by the actual upper limit of corresponding household income division by quintile in 2003 
reported by the Korean National Statistical office. 
Finally, education was selected given the importance of knowledge in forming correct 
perceptions of reality. Studies have demonstrated that there is a considerable amount of 
misperception and low level of knowledge among the public (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Kuklinski et 
al. 1998). Kuklinski et al. (1998), for example, after measuring factual perceptions about welfare 
policy, found that citizens (Illinois residents in their cases) were not only uninformed about 
welfare, but often misinformed. According to them, people had the facts wrong (e.g., people 
grossly overestimated the payments received by a typical family), often in systematic ways, and 
their confidence in beliefs was strong enough to make them reject even the correct facts when 
they were made available. Thus, the level of general knowledge one has obtained through formal 
education, assuming that the more educated respondents have a more accurate understanding, if 
not more educated guess, of social reality, can affect his or her response to an evaluative question 
like estimating the level of income differences in the society. In that the income inequality of 
Korea is, as I examined earlier from a cross national perspective, unduly overestimated in public 
opinion, more educated respondents are less likely to perceive income differences as too large 
than less educated. For education, I used respondents’ final degrees as a measure, where 1 is ‘no 
degree,’ 2 is ‘primary complete,’ 3 is ‘incomplete secondary,’ 4 is ‘secondary complete, ’ 5 is 
‘incomplete university,’ and 6 is ‘university complete.’   
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3.3.2. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 Logistic regression was carried out to assess varying impacts of predictors—the strength 
of distributive justice ideologies, age, gender, income and occupation, and education—on 
Korean people’s perceptions of income differences. With all variables considered together, 
Model I was found significant, χ2=68.785, df=20, N=787, p<.001 (see Table 10) The model was 
able to correctly classify 46.6% of Korean respondents who do not perceive income differences 
as too large and 75.2% of those who perceive income differences as too large, for an overall 
success rate of 62.5%. Table 10 summarizes the logistic regression coefficients, standard errors, 
and odds ratios for each predictor of perceptions of large income differences. Employing 
both .05 and .1 criteria of statistical significance, some of predictors and a few intergroup 
comparisons of odds ratios were found significant.  Especially, both significant and large 
coefficients of the EDJI and the justice gap lent support to the validity of the ideology thesis, 
evidencing a critical function of justice scheme in shaping people’s perceptions of inequality.  
To begin with, my analysis found supporting evidence of the ideology thesis that how 
people view and assess inequality in reality is largely influenced by the dominant justice values 
in the society. In my analysis, justice norms, especially the EDJI, were found to facilitate Korean 
people’s perceptions of large income differences by the coefficient of .450. The interpretation of 
this (and other) coefficient of logistic regression is not as straightforward as that of those of 
linear regression, since the logistic model is written in terms of the log of odds, or a logit. Each 
coefficient in Table 10 represents the change in the log of the odds associated with a one-unit 
change in the independent variable, when all other independent variables are held constant. 
When B is positive, the probability of perceiving income differences as too large goes up, while 
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a negative B means the opposite. To better understand, Exp(B), the odds ratio, was also provided 
in the table. It is the predicted change in odds for a unit increase in the predictor. When Exp(B) is 
less than 1, increasing values of the predictor correspond to decreasing odds of the event’s 
occurrence (in this case, Korean respondent’s perceiving income differences as too large). When 
Exp(B) is greater than 1, increasing values of the predictor correspond to increasing odds of the 
event’s occurrence. If we subtract 1 from the odds ratio and multiply by 100, we get the percent 
change in odds of people’s perceiving income differences as too large. 
Now, looking at the odds ratio for the EDJI, every unit increase in the strength of the 
EDJI is associated with an 87.7% increase in the odds of Koreans’ perceiving income differences 
as too large. As a predictor of perceptions of large income inequality, the EDJI escalates 
dramatically people’s inclination to view income differences in the society as too large. The 
insignificant coefficient of the strength of the MDJI, on the other hand, suggests that in Korea, 
the MDJI is not as relevant a justice value as the EDJI in shaping perceptions of large income 
differences. No matter how one values meritocratic distributive ideologies, it does not either 
encourage or discourage Koreans’ perceiving large income differences. Such a dominant and 
exclusive effect of the EDJI on Korean people’s perceptions of income differences appears to 
resonate with my earlier discussion of popular justice sentiments in Korea. To recapitulate 
briefly, from a cross-national comparison of the strengths of the two competing justice ideologies, 
only in Korea and Spain did the strength of the EDJI surpass that of the MDJI, while the opposite 
was true for the rest. From this, I defined Korea’s primary, or dominant, justice ideology in terms 
of the EDJI and secondary in terms of the MDJI. Here, the finding that the strength of the EDJI 
exclusively reaches Korean people’s perceptions of large income differences while the strength 
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of the MDJI does not substantiates such definition and also supports the key premise of the 
ideology thesis that how and what people perceive of inequality in reality is filtered through the 
dominant justice values of society. Thus, in Korea, popular sentiments toward egalitarian 
distributive justice escalate the gravity of income inequality problem, and people’s shared 
perceptions, as reinforcing each other, generate a cumulative effect, i.e., an inflated public 
awareness of large income differences. 
In addition, the significant effect of the justice gap is also found to hold, where a unit 
increase in the justice gap is associated with a 19.3% increase in the odds of perceiving income 
differences as too large. As studies have shown, a high level of perceived injustice generates a 
corresponding tolerance for a limited range of income inequality. We saw in earlier cross-
national comparisons of the justice gap that Korea was featured not only by its large magnitude, 
but also by a very small difference of the justice gaps between the two response groups, those 
who perceive income differences as too large (TL) versus those who do not (NTL). From those, 
two features, namely, a high level of public discontent with existing economic order and a low 
threshold of social tolerance for unequal, unjust, distribution, were attributed to Koreans’ views 
of inequality. Here, the finding that the justice gap enhanced Korean people’s perceptions of 
large income differences completes the link between the three elements of Korean beliefs about 
inequality, i.e., a high level of perceived injustice of existing economic order, a very low 
threshold of tolerance for income inequality, and their cumulative effects on escalating 
perceptions of large income differences.  
Apart from ideology-related considerations, only few demographic factors served as a 
meaningful predictor. To begin with, no gender-driven difference in perceptions of large income 
79 
 
differences was observed in Korea. My initial assumption that if women were by nature, as 
Gilligan (1982) argued, more egalitarian than men in terms of their justice preferences, Korean 
females would be more susceptible to perceptions of large income differences than male 
counterparts.  As an initial assessment, I compared the strengths of the EDJI between Korean 
males and females. The group mean of the EDJI score for females (N=729) was 3.621 and 3.510 
for male (N=578), and the difference between the two group means was found significant (t=-
2.154, p<.05). Thus, in principle, Gilligan’s assertion that women are more egalitarian than men 
in their justice preferences appears to be the case in Korea. However, my assessment of 
interaction between gender and ideology and its influence on perceptions of large income 
differences found no meaningful relationship. For analysis, I introduce two interactions terms, 
one between gender and the EDJI, and the other between gender and the MDJI. Both terms, 
when assessed separately and together, did not add significance to the overall prediction 
(Χ2=.101, df=1, p=.751 for ‘Gender by the MDJI,’ and Χ2=1.649, df=1, p=.199 for ‘Gender by 
the EDJI.’). Thus, in Korea, while the average strength of the EDJI for women was statistically 
higher than that for men, the overall impact of the EDJI on perceptions of large income 
differences did not differ between men and women. The lack of difference between genders, in 
turn, may hint at the overarching influence of dominant values that the EDJI has on Korean 
people’s perceptions of income differences.  
When it comes to age, a partial difference was located in the contrast between the 
youngest age groups, people aged 18 to 29, and the oldest, people aged 70 or higher. In terms of 
odds ratio, people aged 70 or higher were 2.22 times as likely as those aged 18 to 29 to perceive 
income differences as too large. In other age groups, however, no significant differences from 
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the reference group were noted. If Kelley and Evans (1993)’s speculation on the generational 
difference in ‘equalitarian zeitgeist’ is a general trend and, thus, serves as a meaningful 
explanation for generational difference in the tolerance of social inequality, an opposite pattern 
would have been observed in Korea, where the odds for younger groups to perceive income 
differences in the society as too large are higher than those for oldest group. Looking at Figure 
25, apparently, such an equalitarian zeitgeist among young Koreans does not seem to be the case; 
instead, we find an ‘equalitarian zeitgeist’ skewed toward older age groups, in the sense that the 
average strength of the EDJI increases with age, the highest mean lying in the age group 70 or 
higher and the lowest in the age group 18-29. The largest difference in the strength of the EDJI 
between these two age groups may explain why these two groups in particular, as opposed to the 
other age groups in between who are less differentiated from the oldest age group in terms of the 
strength of the EDJI, show different susceptibility to perceptions of large income differences.   
As for income and occupational hierarchy, no meaningful inter-group differences in the 
odds ratios were observed across all levels. This indicates that in Korea people’s relative 
positions in both income and occupational hierarchy may not play a crucial role in shaping their 
evaluation of income differences in the society. The absence of either leveling effects by people 
at the lower end of income hierarchy or polarizing effects by people at the upper end of income 
hierarchy in terms of their perceptions of income differences, then, suggests that in Korea how 
people perceive and evaluate the level of income inequality in a society is not so much the 
product of objective structural constraints in which they live. Looking at the previous survey 
outcomes regarding Koreans’ beliefs about inequality makes this clear. For instance, in Figures 6 
where people’s beliefs about distributive inequality are sorted by their objective status in 
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economic hierarchy, we do not find any noticeable differences between asset groups in terms of 
their assessment of inequality. Across all asset quintiles, over 80% of respondents in each asset 
group found distribution of income and asset of Korea unequal. The same is true for subsequent 
survey outcomes (see Figures 9, 12, and 15). Across all asset quintiles, no evident leveling or 
polarizing tendency, in terms of their evaluations of economic inequality in the society, is noted. 
Therefore, in Korea, where one stands in the objectively measured hierarchy, i.e., objective 
social constraints, does not seem to play as a crucial mechanism as ideological and subjective 
constraints, e.g., dominant justice norms and the justice gap, in generating perceptions of 
inequality.   
Finally, looking at the influence of education, from comparison to university degree 
holders, no systematic differences are found across all sub levels of degree holders. Assuming 
that people’s educational achievement corresponds to the depth of knowledge they have of 
society, this outcome suggests that knowledge is not a meaningful predictor of telling how 
Koreans perceive income differences in a society. This, at the same time, hints at the possibility 
that perceptions of how unequal society is may not be just a matter of knowledge, or factuality; it 
may also involve the justice evaluation of inequality in people’s scheme of reward justice.  
 In this chapter, I have examined Korean people’s perceptions of income differences in 
light of the ideology thesis, the key premise of which is that people’s perceptions of inequality 
may have less to do with objective social facts, but more with dominant value systems, or 
schemes, of distributive justice that people adhere to. To this end, I first defined Korean people’s 
dominant, or primary, justice sentiments in terms of the two most germane distributive justice 
ideologies, egalitarianism (the EDJI) and meritocracy (the MDJI)  justice norms. Using questions 
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from the ISSP survey on Social Inequality, I measured the strength and homogeneity of the two 
distributive ideologies of Korea, and compared them to those of other OECD countries for cross-
national comparisons. Findings were intriguing. First, the strength and homogeneity of the EDJI 
for Korea was fourth and fifth highest, respectively, of all twenty countries, indicating that both 
strength- and homogeneity-wise, Koreans’ justice sentiments toward egalitarian distributive 
norms are more conspicuous than most of OECD counterparts’. Second, unlike the case of the 
EDJI, the strength and homogeneity of the MDJI were fairly consistent across countries, showing 
less variance. Nonetheless, Korea, in terms of the strength and homogeneity, marked second and 
sixth highest from the bottom, respectively, showing that Koreans’ overall support for and 
consensus on meritocratic distributive justice norms are not strong, as opposed to other OECD 
citizens’. More importantly, only in Korea and Spain, the strength of the EDJI was more 
conspicuous than that of the MDJI, while the opposite was true for other countries. Thus, I 
defined the EDJI as a dominant, or primary, justice scheme of Korea and the MDJI as a 
secondary.  
Having defined the dominant justice scheme in Korea, I further assessed the impact of the 
EDJI on Koreans’ perceptions of large income differences along with other key socio-
demographic predictors by using a logistic regression. My analysis showed that of all 
determinants (or predictors) the EDJI made the greatest change in predicting people’s 
perceptions of large income differences. To illustrate, a unit increase in the strength of the EDJI 
was associated with an 87.7% increase in the odds of Koreans’ perceiving income differences as 
too large. The strength of the MDJI, on the other hand, was found irrelevant to predicting Korean 
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people’s perceptions of income differences. This substantiated a dominant and exclusive role of 
the EDJI on Korean people’s perceptions of income inequality.  
I also tested the impact of the justice gap, another scheme of reward justice, on Korean 
people’s perceptions of income inequality. The justice gap, as a measure of the perceived 
injustice of existing income distribution in the society, was also found to affect people’s 
perceptions of large income inequality, where a unit increase in the justice gap was associated 
with a 19.3% increase in the odds of perceiving income differences as too large. In that the 
justice gap is the expression of people’s discontent with ‘what is,’ derived from their scheme of 
reward justice, this outcome suggests that Koreans’ unfavorable views of existing economic 
order facilitate perceptions of large income differences in the society. 
Apart from the scheme of justice ideologies, few socio-demographic factors in the model 
were found to meet the initial hypothesis. For gender effect, the initial hypothesis that women are 
by nature more equality-oriented in their justice schemes than men and, therefore, this 
orientation will render women more susceptible to perceptions of large income differences than 
men was not validated. In Korea, the average strength of the EDJI for women was higher than 
that for men; however, the difference was not conspicuous enough to make perceptions of large 
income differences more available to women than to men. Age effect wise, I compared different 
age groups under the premise that in the steady value shifts toward equalitarian zeitgeist in the 
developed world younger generations have become more supportive of equality than older 
generations. If this trend is also true for Korea, younger generations would be more likely to 
perceive income differences in Korea as too large than older ones. In Korea, however, the 
opposite outcome was found, where the oldest age group was about 2.21 times as likely as the 
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youngest to perceive income differences as too large, while no other meaningful differences lay 
with other age groups in-between. Moreover, the average strength of the EDJI was found to 
increase with age, the highest mean lying in the oldest and the lowest in the youngest group. The 
largest difference in the strength of the EDJI between the two groups, while other age groups in-
between were less differentiated in the strength from the oldest group, I suspected, could explain 
why the only meaningful difference in the odds ratio of perceiving income differences as too 
large was found between the two, not others.  
To assess how objective social constraints affect Koreans’ perceptions of income 
differences, I compared different income and occupational groups and examined if they had 
different susceptibility to perceptions of large income differences. The hypothesis was that as 
people are inclined to pull the range of incomes towards their own level due to ‘near-sightedness,’ 
people at the upper end of income and occupational hierarchy would see larger income 
differences in a society while people at the lower end of income and occupational hierarchy 
would do the opposite. This so called leveling/polarization effect of income and occupational 
hierarchy on perceptions of income differences was not found in Korea. That is, such objectified 
social constraints, defined by income and occupational hierarchy, did not serve as a meaningful 
predictor of perceptions of large income differences. To elaborate this outcome, I introduced 
relevant survey outcomes in Korea, in which people’s assessment of economic inequality of 
Korea was sorted by respondents’ income and asset status. From the survey, across all levels of 
income and asset groups, no leveling or polarization tendency was observed; instead, they 
differed little, if any, in their views of economic inequality of Korea.   
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Finally, I introduced education to estimate how knowledge would affect people’s 
perceptions of income differences. As I have demonstrated earlier from the cross-national 
comparison, popular beliefs in large income differences of Korea were much inflated for Korea’s 
reality. People’s overstated beliefs about large income inequality, I suspected, may also come 
from their inadequate knowledge of reality. Such possibility, however, did not hold in that 
comparisons between people with a different level of degrees did not show any meaningful 
differences in their susceptibility to perceptions of large income differences. This, I suggested, 
may hint at the fact that how people appraise inequality in a society is not just a matter of 
knowledge or factuality; it may also be a matter of fairness which is derived from their scheme 
of distributive justice.  
In sum, my analysis has shown how people’s scheme of distributive justice affected their 
perceptions of inequality in light of the ideology thesis. In the following, I will introduce another 
theoretical frame, the structural position thesis, and explain Korean people’s perceptions of large 








CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON PERCEPTION 
OF INEQUALITY 
4.1. STRUCTURAL POSITION THESIS   
 In this section, I discuss Korean people’s perceptions of inequality in light of the 
structural position thesis. In general, the thesis emphasizes the importance of people’s socio-
economic status and associated self-interest considerations in constructing personal attitudes 
toward inequality, on the assumption that reference standards around which their evaluation of 
inequality are organized would be aligned along their evaluations and expectations of socio-
economic conditions (Alwin, Gornev and Khakhulina 1995; Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1999; 
Wegener 1987b; Wegener 1991; Wegener and Liebig 1995b). 
In this respect, scholars have paid special attention to individuals’ economic experiences 
regarding mobility and reward (Boudon 1986; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Hyman 1960; 
Kluegel and Smith 1986; Lane 1959; Stouffer 1949; Wegener 1991; Wegener and Liebig 1995a). 
The key argument is that the favorable experiences of mobility and reward, namely, upward 
mobility and fair reward in the course of career, would make people more supportive of the 
legitimacy of inequality in principle, enabling them tolerate a greater range of inequality. On this 
score, Kluegel and Smith (1986), for instance, argued that the popular support for market justice 
norms and beliefs among the American public would be attributable, partly, to widespread 
optimistic views on their socio-economic living conditions; that is, most American, they found, 
assessed their material living conditions as having improved over time, and such widespread 
optimism in turn served to suppress, if not eliminate, working class consciousness among the 
American public, and that working class consciousness would be replaced by the favorable 
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norms of and beliefs about material inequality created by the market. They concluded that this 
process facilitated a social trend in which individuals were held responsible for their own 
economic fates, and thus, the poor were highly stigmatized, or blamed for their own plight. 
Similarly, Lane (1959) discussed a “fear of equality” prevalent among the American working 
class, by which he meant that the working class people tended to distance themselves from the 
poor in order to maintain a favorable social identity and self-esteem. To this end, according to 
Lane, the working class people emphasized the lack of moral character, effort, or talent of the 
poor, while attributing more favorable characteristics to themselves and justifying existing social 
inequalities.  
Likewise, Wegener and Liebig (1995a) explored the influence of mobility experience on 
justice preference at a micro-level in Eastern and Western Germany, and found that those who 
experienced an increase in position at their job shifts were inclined to favor economic liberalism, 
voicing their support for individual achievement as a just principle for the unequal distribution of 
the market resources, a finding parallel to that of Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) in the United States. 
Along with the mobility experiences of individuals, emphasis also has been placed on the 
reward experiences of individuals. The key premise of this perspective is that those who do not 
see the market as responsive to their hard work would not only be discouraged from participating 
in the market competition, but also would disapprove of the outcome that resulted from it. The 
critical function of the perceived responsiveness of the system to the investment individuals have 
made during the mobility process in shaping people’s justice beliefs is well exemplified by 
Bourdon’s critique (1986) of Stouffer et al. (1949). In The American Soldier (1949), Stouffer and 
his colleagues analyzed two military units, the Air Corps and the Military Police, and discovered 
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that, despite the substantially better promotion rate at the Air Corps, the Air Corps personnel 
were paradoxically more disgruntled with their promotion chances than their counterparts. For 
explanations, they used the concept of a reference group, where they argued that since there were 
a large number of personnel in the Air Corps who got promoted, those who were not promoted 
readily contrasted themselves to their fortunate comrades, and got disgruntled with the 
promotion system; in contrast, in the Military Police, only a small number of personnel were 
lucky enough to get promoted, and most of those who did not shared the same unhappy lot, 
rowing in the same boat as the majority; therefore, they felt less frustration or anger than their 
Air Corps counterparts.  
Boudon (1986), however, criticized the arbitrariness of the reference group explanation 
that Stouffer and his colleague initially proposed, questioning why the Air Corps personnel 
compared themselves with their many relatively successful comrades, whereas the Military 
Police personnel compared themselves with their relatively unsuccessful colleagues. Boudon, 
instead, proposed an alternative explanation, where he argued that it was the difference in the 
subjective assessment of rewards vis-à-vis profit expectation of competition which made the Air 
Corps personnel more dissatisfied than the Military Police personnel. To illustrate, in the Air 
Corps, more individuals are encouraged to join the competition due to a high subjective profit 
expectation of competition among themselves which resulted from a high probability of 
promotion; however, the probability of promotion, by nature, is always much smaller than one; 
as a result, many losers of the competition who ended up finding their profit expectation in vain 
become disgruntled. In the Military Police, in contrast, fewer people are encouraged to compete 
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for promotion from the beginning due to a low subjective profit expectation of competition; 
hence, fewer losers who find profit expectation in vain are produced.  
Boudon’s explanation, in sum, hints that as much as mobility experience available to 
each individual matters, how one assesses given outcomes vis-à-vis initial profit expectation 
would also play a vital role in determining his or her satisfaction with mobility. Of interest is that 
Boudon’s argument resonates very closely with Jasso’s specification of the justice evaluation 
function, where she used two components, actual rewards and rewards considered as just, to 
measure individual justice sentiments (satisfaction with what is). Here, Boudon’s account also 
employs two similar components, outcome and profit expectation, to explain different justice 
sentiments between the two military personnel.  
Therefore, in my analysis, individual assessment of justness is also taken into account to 
better measure the influence of mobility experiences on people’s perceptions of income 
differences in Korea. In the following, I will explain how they are measured for analysis, and 
explore their relevance to people’s susceptibility to perceptions of income differences in Korea.   
4.2. MOBILITY, PERSONAL JUSTICE GAP, AND PERCEPTIONS OF INCOME 
DIFFERENCES  
4.2.1. MEASURES 
 As for individual mobility experience, the following three components were introduced: 
direction of mobility, degree of mobility, and current position. While measuring these 
components based on the actual mobility indicators of individuals would be meaningful, such 
information was not available in the 2003 Korean ISSP survey. Instead, I used people’s self-
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identified social mobility information in the survey, and calculated these three components of 
mobility. The two question used for calculation were  
 In our society there are groups which tend to be toward the top and groups which tend to 
be toward the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you 
put yourself on this scale? And ten years ago, where did you fit in then? 
Respondents were given a ten-point response scale, where 1 = top and 10 = bottom. For analysis, 
I reversed its initial order so that a larger scale corresponds to a higher status. Using the reversed 
scale, I identified directions of mobility by subtracting the past social status scale from the 
current social status scale, where a positive difference was defined as an upward mobility 
experience, and a negative and zero differences were defined as a downward and immobile 
mobility experience, respectively.  For contrast, people were divided, in terms of directions, into 
two groups, ‘upward’ and ‘down/immobile.’ For the degree of mobility, I used the difference 
between the two scales. And, current position was indicated by respondent’s response to the 
current social status.  
As for the measure of individual assessment of justness pertinent to mobility, it was not 
possible to know from the survey how much individual profit expectation pertinent to mobility 
experience has been met, not to mention how much effort or investment pertinent to mobility has 
been put by each respondent to reach where he or she is. Given limitation, I used the following 
information from the survey as a proxy for the assessment of justness pertinent to mobility: 
respondents’ current salary as an indicator of his final achievement from mobility, and the level 
of salary one believes to be adequate for the kind of job one has as an indicator of profit 
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expectation. The former came from respondents’ reported salary in the survey, and the latter 
came from the following question in the survey: 
 What do you think people in your occupation ought to be paid? How much do you think 
they should earn per month?  
Respondents wrote down the amount of just pay for their occupations in the survey. To measure 
personal assessment of justness in it, I used Jasso’s justice evaluation formula,  
Ji =ln(Ai/Ci), 
where the numerator, Ai, used the actual salary that respondent i reported, and the denominator, 
Ci, used the level of salary that respondent i reported to be adequate for his or her occupation. 
The interpretation of this function is as follows: a positive Ji means his reward level exceeded his 
initial profit expectation, a negative means the opposite, and 0 means his reward met his profit 
expectation justly.  
4.2.2. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
 For analysis, the four new measures introduced above were added to the logistic 
regression model (Model I) which was used in the previous chapter. I treated other variables as 
they were, and examined how these new predictors were related to perceptions of income 
differences in Korea. These four variables, when added to Model I, were found to make a 
significant difference to the overall model fit, by χ2=28.073, df=5, p<.05. With these new 
predictors in, Model II (χ2=96.858, df=25, p<.05, N=787) was able to better classify 53.2% (as 
opposed to 46.6% in Model I) of Korean respondents who do not perceive income differences as 
too large and 75.6% (as opposed to 75.2% in Model I) of those who perceive income differences 
as too large, for an overall success rate of 65.7% (as opposed to 62.5% in Model I). The new 
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logistic regression coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratios are summarized under Model II 
in Table 10.  
With new predictors in, no noticeable changes in the significance of existing predictors 
are noted between the two models. Both the EDJI and the justice gap are found significant in 
both Models, with only a minor change in the coefficient for the justice gap. In Model II, a unit 
change in the justice gap is associated with a 17.4% increase in the odds of perceiving income 
differences as too large. Still, the perceived injustice of income distribution in the society 
affected adversely people’s perceptions of income inequality; the more unjust gap people see, the 
more likely they are to overestimate the degree of income differences. As was the case in Model 
I, the EDJI continues to be identified as the most influential predictor of perceptions of income 
inequality, where a unit increase in the strength of the EDJI leads to an 87.8% increase in the 
odds of perceiving income differences as too large. The MDJI, on the other hand, has no 
significance in Model II, either. This outcome, again, confirms that the EDJI, as a dominant 
scheme of justice norms, maneuvers Korean people’s beliefs about inequality, crafting, against 
reality, an image of large income disparities. Turning to other socio-demographic factors in the 
model, no significant differences are observed between different age, income, occupational, and 
gender groups. In Model I, I noted a partial difference between the two age groups, people aged 
18 to 29 and people aged 70 or higher, in terms of their perceptions of large income differences. 
Here, such difference is no longer found to be meaningful.  
With respect to the influence of the four new predictors, three mobility measures and one 
justness measure, my analysis found most of them relevant to Korean people’s preconceptions of 
large income inequality. With respect to current social status, measured in a ten-point scale, one 
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scale increase is associated with a 19% decrease in the odds of perceiving income differences as 
too large. As people locate themselves at the upper end of the scale, they become less likely to 
view income differences too large. This tendency among Koreans is in line with a fairly 
consistent finding of the relationship between social position and attitudes toward inequality, 
where people who classify themselves at the bottom of society more often hold egalitarian views 
of inequality, more in favor of income equalization (Gijsberts 2002; Kelley and Evans 1993). 
Thus, I further assessed whether the influence of the EDJI on perceptions of income differences 
can be stronger among people at the bottom as opposed to those at the upper end. To this end, I 
examined an interaction between the EDJI and social status, where social status variable was 
treated as a categorical and a continuous variable, respectively. The result, in either case, found 
that the influence of the EDJI on perceptions of income differences did not vary significantly 
with social status or between social status groups (Χ2=7.035, df=9, p=.633 for ‘social status 
(categorical) by the EDJI,’ and Χ2=.968, df=1, p=.325 for ‘social status (continuous) by the 
EDJI); hence, no synergy effect of the EDJI by social status on perceptions of large income 
differences in Korea.  
What is also noted here about the meaningful influence of subjective social status on 
people’s evaluation of income differences is that how people evaluate income differences may 
not be so much a matter of ‘where they stand’ as a matter of ‘where they believe they stand. This 
is particularly so in my analysis, as other objective indicators which were used to define people 
position in the real stratification system, e.g., income, occupational hierarchy, or educational 
level, did not produce expected outcomes, while this subjective parameter, namely, people’s self-
identified social status, did. On this score, Evans et al.(1992) shed light on the importance of 
94 
 
subjective status identification and its influence on people’s perceptions of social inequality. 
People, according to them, are inclined to exaggerate the size of their social class due to a 
common cognitive bias known as the ‘availability heuristic.’ As a systematic perceptual bias, the 
availability heuristic encourage people to overestimate the number of persons similar to 
themselves (namely, reference group), inducing people to believe that their own beliefs and 
attitudes are not unique or minor, but common in society and shared by many others. Evans et al. 
assumed that this general cognitive bias would be applied to people’s subjective status 
identification as well. They said  
…because of a common cognitive bias called the “availability heuristic,” 
reference groups decisively affect people's perceptions of the stratification 
system... high status people exaggerate the size of the higher classes and minimize 
the size of the lower classes, so envisioning a relatively equalitarian society. 
Conversely, low status people exaggerate the size of the lower classes which leads 
them to envision an elitist society. Prosperous people see others as prosperous 
while the poor see others as poor. People also tend to project their subjective class 
onto others—those who place themselves high in the class system also view 
others as high, while those who locate themselves in a lower class perceive others 
as low. (P. 477) 
As theorized, if people overstate the size of their perceived social status group due to the 
availability heuristic, then the perceived levels of economic inequality of a society, or income 
differences in this case, would be likely to be more exaggerated among those who classify 
themselves at bottom end of social scale. That is, as Evans et al. illustrated, the projection of an 
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elite image of a society would tempt people, particularly those who saw themselves as a low 
social status, to view current income differences between individuals as greater than they really 
are.    
As for the direction and extent of mobility, the direction of mobility, when considered 
separately from the extent of mobility, does not seem have a meaningful effect on people’s 
perceptions of income differences, as we do not observe any difference between the two mobility 
groups. However, when it is coupled with the extent of mobility, it does reveal group differences. 
To illustrate, in my analysis, the two mobility groups, upward vis-à-vis downward/immobile 
groups, were coded into 1 and 0, the latter being a reference group. Thus, the coefficient of -.571 
for the interaction between mobility direction and degree of mobility indicates the difference in 
the coefficients of degree of mobility between the two groups. For the downward/immobile 
groups, the coefficient of degree of mobility is .443, and -.128 (=.443-.571) for the upward 
mobility group. Converting these two coefficients into Exp(B), they are 1.557 and .879, 
respectively. For the downward/immobile groups, thus, one scale change from past to current 
social status is associated with a 55.7% increase in the odds of perceiving income differences as 
too large; for the upward groups, one scale change from past to current social status is associated 
with a 12.1% decrease in the odds of perceiving income differences as too large. A note of 
caution here is that the meaning of one scale change in the two groups is opposite: for the former, 
it means moving downward along the social scale, and for the latter it means moving upward 
along the scale. Given explanations, therefore, it is clear that people’s mobility experiences in 
Korea, direction and degree wise, do craft different perceptions of income differences.  
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Finally, looking at the influence of individual level justness, a significant influence on 
perceptions of income differences is observed, where one unit increase in the individual level 
justness is associated with a 35% decrease in the odds of perceiving income differences as too 
large. Apparently, when people find their final achievement (in this case, their current wage) 
exceeds initial profit expectation (in this case a wage they believe to be adequate for their 
occupations), they seem to become more tolerant of, if not indifferent to, economic inequality in 
a society. However, this finding, when contrasted to the influence of the justice gap on people’s 
assessment of income differences, also sheds light on a paradoxical, if not self-interest oriented, 
individual scheme of reward justice. To recall, the justness measure at an individual level used in 
my analysis is based on Jasso’s justice evaluation formula. The same goes for the justice gap. 
Therefore, their interpretations do not differ in principle, where a large and positive value in both 
terms indicates injustice: in case of the justness at a personal level, a positive value of Ji  simply 
indicates that what he or she is earning is in fact an over-reward; by the same token, a large and 
positive value of the justice gap also indicates that people see certain incumbents of particular 
occupation (the chairman of large company in this case) are unduly overpaid while other 
incumbents of particular occupation (unskilled worker in this case) are unduly under-paid. While 
both measures indicate the level of injustice, one at an individual level and the other at a societal 
level, its influence on perceptions of income differences is contrasting. When such injustice (i.e., 
over-reward) happens to him or herself, it is no longer injustice; however, if the same thing 
happens in a society, it is injustice and makes people less tolerant of income inequality. 
Apparently, results from my analysis show that this contradictory, if not selfish, scheme of 
reward justice is true for Koreans. 
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In this chapter, I have analyzed Korean people’s perceptions of income differences in 
light of the structural position thesis, the key premise of which is that people’s self-interest 
calculation based on their socio-economic positions in the hierarchy systematically distorts their 
perceptions of inequality. To this end, I focused on people’s mobility and its justness experiences, 
and examined their influences. For analysis, I introduced three elements of social mobility, 
direction, extent, and current social status, and its justness evaluation. The first three were 
measured by comparing people’s current to past social status, where a positive difference was 
defined as an upward mobility, whereas a negative or zero difference was defined as an 
downward/immobile mobility. Its extent was measured by the difference between the two status 
scales that people marked. For the justness evaluation of mobility, I used people’s reported wage, 
as a proxy for their final achievement from mobility, and a legitimate wage for their occupation, 
as a proxy for their subjective profit expectation of mobility. For specification of this evaluation, 
I employed Jasso’s justice evaluation function.  
According to my findings, people’s social status made a significant difference in their 
perceptions of income differences. As people’s self-identified social status increased by one 
scale, the odds of perceiving large income differences decreased by a multiplicative factor 
of .809; meaning that people who classify themselves at the upper end of the social scale are 
more likely to view current income inequality as less problematic. Individuals’ mobility 
experiences were also found as a meaningful predictor of perceptions of income differences. This 
was typically the case, when the direction of mobility was combined with the extent of mobility. 
For the upper mobility groups, one scale change from their past to current status, i.e., moving 
upward by one scale, decreased the odds of crafting perceptions of large income differences by a 
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multiplicative factor of .879. In contrast, for the downward/immobile groups, the same one scale 
change from their past to current status, i.e., moving downward by one scale, increased the odds 
by a multiplicative factor of 1.557.  
While these findings substantiated the importance of structural position in shaping 
people’s views of inequality, I also noted the relative importance of perceived vis-à-vis objective 
status in the stratification system. That is, in Korea, when people were defined by their objective 
status in the stratification system and compared to each other in terms of their susceptibility to 
perceptions of large income differences, no significant differences were noted; with this self-
identified social scale, however, a meaningful difference was revealed. This outcome, I 
suggested, may indicate that what shapes people’s perceptions of inequality in Korea may not be 
so much a matter of ‘where they stand in reality’ as a matter of ‘where they think they stand.’ 
Finally, the justness evaluation at a personal level was also found to craft Korean 
people’s perceptions of income differences, where a unit increase in the measure, i.e., people’s 
final achievement from mobility exceeds their profit expectation, decreased the odds of 
perceiving large income differences by a multiplicative factor of .651. Apparently, a positive 
assessment of their final achievement made people more tolerant of, if not indifferent to, income 
inequality in the society. Nonetheless, this justness evaluation at a personal level also revealed a 
problematic, or simply selfish, nature of human justice scheme, when contrasted to the effect of 
the justice gap on perceptions of inequality. Both the justice gap and the justness measures were 
originally devised to indicate the level of injustice of reward, the former at the societal level and 
the latter at the personal level. Except for this difference in the scope, both terms address the 
same injustice associated with an over-reward issue. Given the similarity between the two 
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measures in terms of their implication, in Korea, an increase in the justice gap escalated the odds 
of perceiving large income differences, while the same increase in the justness evaluation at a 
personal level worked in the opposite direction. Apparently, when people saw injustice due to an 
over-reward occurring in the society, they became less tolerant of existing inequality; however, 
when the same injustice happened to them, they did not consider it unjust, and rather became 
more tolerant of income inequality. This inconsistent application of justice scheme was captured 
by the contrasting effects of the justice gap and the justness measures on Korean people’s 
perceptions of large income differences.  













CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 Opinion research in major capitalist democracies has identified one of the key elements 
of legitimacy of the capitalist economic order in public opinion: popular adherence to the norms 
and beliefs that justify economic inequality. The prevailing commitment to those norms and 
beliefs by a majority of citizens, scholars have suggested, serves to buttress the legitimacy of 
capitalism in Western society. However, far less has been known about this topic in non-Western 
contexts. That is, we do not know whether popular commitment to the norms and beliefs that 
justify inequality is also prevalent among the citizens of non-Western capitalist societies. Is 
popular commitment to such norms and beliefs a universal feature of affluent capitalist societies? 
That is, is belief in the justice of economic inequality a dominant norm in advanced capitalist 
economies? In an effort to fill the gap in knowledge of public beliefs and norms regarding the 
justice of inequality in non-Western capitalist democracies, this research proposed to focus on 
Korea. And, my research found that in contrast to the popular legitimization of economic 
inequality in Western public opinion, unfavorable perceptions and norms of inequality prevailed 
in Korean public opinion.  
As diagnosed from the cross national comparison with other OECD countries, first, 
popular beliefs about large income differences of Korea, as contrasted with varying income 
inequality indices of other OECD countries, were far blown out of proportion, indicating that the 
threat of income differences were unduly exaggerated in Korean public opinion; second, the 
perceived injustice of the income distribution in the society, as measured by the justice gap, was 
strong among Koreans, indicating that Koreans were largely discontent with the legitimacy of 
current income distribution in the society; third, the threshold of public tolerance for unequal, if 
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not unjust, distribution in the society was relatively low in Korea, given the small difference in 
the justice gaps between those who perceived income differences as too large (TL) and those 
who did not (NTL); and fourth, the pursuit of egalitarian distributive justice was more popularly 
supported in Korea than in other OECD countries, and, only in Korea and Spain, its relative 
strength to meritocratic distributive justice was greater, indicating that Koreans’ ultimate, if not 
primary, distributive justice ideal consisted more in equality than equity. 
In subsequent analyses, it was further discovered that, in Korea, support for egalitarian 
distributive justice, compared to other socio-economic determinants in the model, made Koreans 
more vulnerable to unfavorable views of economic inequality. That is, in facilitating unfavorable 
public views of economic inequality in Korea, the ideological impact of egalitarian distributive 
justice was more influential than other socio-demographic factors, to the extent that a unit 
increase in the strength of egalitarian distributive justice was associated with the largest increase 
in the odds of Koreans’ conceiving of income differences in the society as too large. The more 
people pursued egalitarian distributive ideal, the more likely they were to view income 
differences in Korean society as conspicuous. While not as influential as the ideological impact 
of egalitarian distributive justice, people’s discontent with current income distribution in the 
society also facilitated unfavorable views of income differences, to the extent that a high level of 
perceived injustice of the income distribution in the society, as measured by the justice gap, led 
people to conceive of current income inequality as more problematic. Apparently, both 
normative bias toward distributive equality and popular discontent with the legitimacy of current 
income distribution in Korean public opinion contributed to the generation of unfavorable public 
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perceptions of large income inequality, even if the threat of large income inequality did not really 
exist.  
If economic inequality is an inevitable feature of the socio-economic structure of 
capitalist societies, the success of stable capitalist development, as Lane and many other students 
of social justice study have articulated, depends in large part on people’s ability and willingness 
to adapt to the cyclical nature of free market system. That is, the extent to which people can 
perceive and legitimize persistent inequality in the society in the context of social justice and 
these favorable perceptions and norms subsequently can keep in check radical social and 
political struggles against economic inequality becomes a critical requisite for the development 
of stable capitalism. In this regard, the Korean public’s unfavorable perceptions and norms of 
economic inequality appear to cast a bleak, if not worrying, outlook on the development of stable 
capitalism in Korea.  
As diagnosed in my analysis, despite Korea’s equitable distributive reality, not only was 
the threat of large income inequality unduly overstated in public opinion, but also a high level of 
perceived injustice of current income distribution and a low tolerance for inequality were 
commonplace and, more importantly, facilitated the threat of large income inequality in public 
mind. If these unfavorable views denote Koreans’ growing dissatisfaction with existing 
economic order, Korean society may well be teetering on the brink of radical social and political 
struggles against economic inequality. This possibility is all the more probable when we take 
into account the importance of egalitarian distributive principle in Koreans’ pursuit of 
distributive justice. As my analysis disclosed, Koreans showed a stronger support for the 
egalitarian distributive justice ideology and were less enthusiastic about the meritocratic 
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distributive justice ideology than other fellow OECD citizens, and in Korea popular perceptions 
of large income differences were dominantly driven by this ideological bias toward equality.  
Koreans’ pursuit of equality for the sake of social justice may not be a problem in and of 
itself only if its achievement is to ensure a pluralist social harmony, not to restore a collectivist or 
totalistic social unity of the past. During the period of modernization under the military regimes 
in Korea, there had been a constant collective emphasis as the government tried to mobilize the 
nation for its modernization efforts. In the absence of genuine democratic and individualist 
virtues, it was convenient for the authoritarian military regimes to employ collectivist rhetoric 
from the Confucian ethics. The military regimes in Korea from the 1960s through the 1980s 
dragged out the Confucian concepts of loyalty and filial piety as such, working them into an 
attitude of deferential obedience to authoritarian rule. However, the most convenient excuse was 
collective security against the communist threat from the North Korea. For the sake of and in the 
name of national security, the aspirations of the masses for the greater democratic freedom and 
share of the fruits of modernization were dismissed most often in coercive manners, and such 
aspirations were contained within an idea of communitarian solidarity, a moral standard against 
which the open pursuit of individualist gains in both political and economic domains was 
censored. In this regard, Eckert (1993) noted,  
The essential characteristics of capitalism, namely the dependence upon an 
intense appeal to the money-making and money-loving instincts of 
individuals…such instincts are no less common to Korean than to other 
people…One looks in vain, however, for anything remotely resembling the ideas 
of Adam Smith or John Locke in either elite or popular Korean culture. The 
104 
 
pursuit of personal profit has never been raised to the level of a moral precept in 
Korea, and even today the right of private property, though guaranteed by law, 
falls far short of being the sacrosanct tenet it has long been in the West. (P. 117) 
These elements of collectivism in Korea, which had been aggressively implanted during the 
period of modernization under the military regime, may explain why Koreans are, as diagnosed 
in my research, biased to a great extent toward the ideal of equality and overreact to economic 
inequality by perceiving more income differences than are there in reality, perceiving a high 
level of injustice of current distribution, and tolerating only a limited range of inequality.  
 This statement, however, does not devalue any positive contribution that the pursuit of 
equality had made to Korea’s capitalist and social development in the past. Though not sorely 
attributable to this ideological bias toward equality, popular adherence to the ideal of equality 
may have made it possible for Korea, unlike other developing countries, to accomplish a 
relatively equitable income distribution during the rapid economic expansion. Likewise, amongst 
all, nothing would have better explained, or contributed to, Korea’s rapid and successful 
industrialization in the past than the growth of egalitarian aspirations for education among 
Koreans of all backgrounds. It is quite intriguing to observe how this social demand for equal 
education, or “education fever,” has facilitated educational policies that promoted open access to 
all levels of schooling and served a major and perhaps the primary engine of the nation’s 
transformation into a modern, prosperous, highly literate society. According to Seth (2005), with 
the removal of traditional barriers that had historically limited higher education to an hereditary 
elite following the collapse of the colonial regime and the Korean War, millions of ordinary 
Koreans saw the possibility of improving their lives and status through their education. Despite 
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the extreme poverty of the late 1940s and 1950s, the dislocation caused by the Korean War, and 
the political instability of the early republic, South Koreans had poured into the schools at a rate 
equaled by few other developing countries. The advent of a general population impatient with 
any restrictions on their pursuit of degrees was greatly responded by the military regimes. When 
the military government under Park, Chung Hee (1961-1979) came to power, for example, the 
Park regime abolished the middle school and high school entrance examination carried out in 
stages between 1969 and 1975 and restricted applicants to middle schools and high schools in 
their resident city or province in order to reduce the pressure on examinations and to avert 
excessive concentration of students on certain school districts with reputation. These efforts at 
equalization, though constantly challenged by feverish students and their families who continued 
to find ways to circumvent regulations to promote their own success, not only contributed to 
social cohesion , but also provided a literate workforce with the skills needed for a newly 
industrializing economy even though this later generated strains between the demand for higher 
levels of education and the state’s efforts to prevent an oversupply of advanced degree holders. 
The military regime’s efforts to meet the general public’s fever for the equalization of education 
continued. Following the assumption of power by Chun, Doo Hwan in 1980, the Ministry of 
Education under the Chun regime implemented a number of reforms designed to make the 
system more fair and to increase higher education opportunities for the population at large. In a 
very popular move, the ministry dramatically increased enrollment at large. The number of high 
school graduates accepted into colleges and universities was increased by almost 3.5 times 
between 1980 and 1989, from 403,000 students in 1980 to more than 1.4 million in 1989. 
Similarly, the number of students attending all kinds of higher educational institutions was 
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increased  by almost 2.2 times between 1980 and 1987, from almost 600,000 students in 1980 to 
1,340,381 in 1987. The Chun regime also prohibited private, after-school tutoring. Formerly, 
private tutors could charge exorbitant rates if they had a good "track record" of getting students 
into the right schools through intensive coaching, especially in English and in mathematics. This 
situation gave wealthy families an unfair advantage in the competition. Under the new rules, 
students receiving tutoring could be suspended from school and their tutors dismissed from their 
jobs. As such, the strong demand for equality in education from the bottom, i.e., the general 
public, coupled with the military regime’s top-down mobilization endeavor, has undoubtedly 
facilitated Korea’s educational development in the macro view. 
Nonetheless, it is also crucial to note that the unstrained pursuit of the equalization of 
education under the military regimes, once the nation’s single greatest achievement in the macro 
view, was not just an enormous asset for Korea’s educational development. While the expansion 
of higher education in and of itself was a unparalleled experience, hardly equaled by any other 
developing nation then and even its fellow OECD members today, such aspiration for the 
equality of education was manifested primarily in the uniformity of education in both contents 
and standards simply for everyone. Different needs and voices of individuals were neglected in 
the name of the uniformity, and any efforts at needed reforms to make the educational system 
and pedagogy more flexible and creative were hindered as they were considered to pose a threat 
to this unity. As such, the ideal of equality pursued by the military regime in the past was largely 
for the sake of collectivist and totalistic social unity, a political maneuver to facilitate the military 
government’s effective social control, not for the sake of equality of conditions that Tocqueville 
(1999) defined as a fundamental cornerstone of a democratic social life. In the absence of 
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institutional grounds to claim the legitimacy of its political power, the configuration of Korean 
society into an ordered totality based on collective social unity and military orderliness enabled 
the military regime to mobilize a deferential obedience to authoritarian rule from top to bottom, 
making people into the ultimate source of legitimization, and gain popular justification of 
political power. The ideal of equality, then, was a crucial ideological and political tactic for the 
military regime to ensure that the nation see society flourishing in collective harmony without 
the aggravations of the selfish pursuit of personal profit. The tactic was enforced without 
discrimination. From the powerless to the privileged, from the poor to the rich, as Song (2006) 
argued, the military regime was determined to repress any social entities whose social and 
political behaviors were unsatisfactorily acculturated into the ideals of equality and social 
solidarity; only the acculturated who conformed to its configuration were exempt from this 
wholesale repression. Therefore, Korea’s egalitarian achievement during the period of 
modernization was not only a top-down political maneuver to secure a totalistic social solidarity, 
but also a trade-off for the military regime’s indiscriminating and authoritarian repression of the 
free and, more importantly, democratic pursuit of individualist gains.   
Equality of conditions forcefully embodied only in the abstract rhetoric of collectivism is 
far from Tocquevillian equality of conditions, i.e., the amelioration of oppressive social 
conditions which prevent individuals from openly and freely claiming their own economic and 
political rights. In Tocquevillian context, the value of egalitarian achievement comes into its own 
in the modern sense only when combined with the affirmation of liberal individuals. Without 
getting in touch with the concrete content of the collectivity articulated by individuals, 
egalitarian achievement, no matter how successful it is in the macro view, has no substantive 
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meaning in the micro view; its blind pursuit only takes away individual autonomy and subjects 
the individual to the whim of a regulatory and coercive constraint in the name of social justice 
just like the strong equalization of education in Korea only forced all individuals, including 
students and teachers, and schools, to follow a rigidly uniform curriculum and policy set by the 
military government. This is what happened in Korea in the past and in its military regime.   
The authoritarian military regime does no longer exist in present-day Korea. Through 
unceasing popular struggle from the 1970s through the 1980s, which involved violence and 
enormous sacrifice on the part of citizens, the first non-military civilian government was 
inaugurated in 1993. Since then, greater liberalization has been pursued both in economy and 
politics. Greater decentralization and less government control has enabled private firms to 
compete in the open market even in areas highly regulated by government, and more individuals 
than ever before in Korea’s history openly pursue personal political and economic gains without 
a fear, in particular, of the wholesale government retaliation of the past. Indeed, the menace of 
authoritarian social control of the past, at least in its  physical manifestation, perished long ago; 
yet, its heritage, though less obvious in people’s ideas and habits than before, still lingers in and 
haunts Korean society today, putting fetters on Korea’s advancement in both democracy and 
capitalism. Without getting in touch with the concrete content of the collectivity, the ideal of 
social harmony and communitarian solidarity is still abusively modulated into the abstract 
rhetoric of collectivism of the past, i.e., a totalistic social unity, and the importance of diversity 
articulated by individuals in collectivity is not properly appreciated in public discourses on the 
democratic organization of society. The claim of collectivity on the individual is credited, but not 
vice versa. This is not because there are no laws grating the individual rights in Korean society 
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today. The struggle for democracy of the past has consolidated a solid legal base for the rights of 
the individual and made provisions for a more civilized life. Yet, there is not a culture in society 
that would support whatever legal bases exist concerning these rights. A totalistic collective 
appeal on the ground of social harmony continues to subject the individual to the normative 
regulation of society, as it did in the past; this time only in the absence of top-down authoritarian 
coercion. Koreans’ unfavorable perceptions and norms of economic inequality which belie their 
economic reality, that is, despite their equitable income distribution in reality, for Koreans to 
overstate the threat of income differences than are there, express a high level of discontent with 
current income distribution, and tolerate only a small range of income differences, only manifest 
how much Koreans, as the ultimate source of, if not a means to, social harmony, pursue a 
totalistic unity, i.e., a mechanical sameness in the macro view; and, more importantly, how 
vulnerably such harmony, like a house of cards, can collapse before the development of 
economic and political diversity and differences between individuals, a distinguishing mark of a 
pluralist democracy and a free capitalism.  
The pursuit of equality is constructive if and only if its achievement is motivated to 
enhance, not constrain, the freedom and rights of individuals. The Korean public’s unfavorable 
perceptions and norms regarding economic inequality, unfortunately, are not derived from this 
motive; they rather arise because such economic differences in the society pose a threat to a 
totalistic social unity which Koreans, unwillingly in the past but willingly at present, have 
deemed as a source of social harmony and justice. The longer Korean society is entrapped into 
the abstract rhetoric of collectivity of the past and embodies the ideal of collective harmony in 
the pursuit of a totalistic equality in the macro view, the harder it becomes to adapt to a growing 
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interest in and demand for economic and political diversity between individuals if Korean 
society is to make a new leap forward in its democratic and capitalist development in the future. 
Beyond the absence of favorable beliefs and norms regarding inequality as popularly conceived 
of in the West, the Korean public’s unfavorable perceptions and norms regarding economic 
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Figure 1. GNI per capita of Korea 
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Figure 2. GNI and GDP growth rate of Korea 
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Figure 3. Gini Coefficient of Korea from 1979 to 2006 
 










































































































































 Figure 4. Public perceptions of inequality of Korea in 1990 
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Figure 5. Beliefs about economic inequality in 1990 (sorted by social status groups) 
 
 

















 Figure 6. Beliefs about economic inequality in 1990 (sorted by five quintile asset groups) 
 
 

















Figure 7. Public perceptions of inequality of Korea in 1995 
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Figure 8. Beliefs about economic inequality in 1995 (sorted by social status groups) 
 
 


















Figure 9. Beliefs about economic inequality in 1995 (sorted by five quintile asset groups) 
 
 
















Figure 10. Public perceptions of inequality of Korea in 2000 
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Figure 11. Beliefs about economic inequality in 2000 (sorted by social status groups) 
 
 



















Figure 12. Beliefs about economic inequality in 2000 (sorted by five quintile asset groups) 
 
 



















Figure 13. Public perceptions of inequality of Korea in 2005 
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Figure 14. Beliefs about economic inequality in 2005 (sorted by social status groups) 
 
 




















Figure 15. Beliefs about economic inequality in 2005 (sorted by five quintile asset groups) 
 
 

















Figure 16. Five cultural dimensions of Korea 
 
Data are reconstructed from http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_south_korea.shtml. 
PDI: Power Distance Index  
IDV: Individualism  
MAS: Masculinity  
UAI: Uncertainty Avoidance Index  
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Figure 17. Strength of individualistic cultural orientation (IDV) across countries 
 
 
Data are reconstructed from http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php 
*: Estimated values 






















































































































































































































































































Figure 18. Percentages of respondents perceiving income difference as too large 
 
Percentages are measured by the share of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the statement, “Income differences in 



















































































































































































































































































Figure 19. Support for various distributive criteria (the 1991 survey) 
 
 
Source: Son, Tae Won. 1992. "Gong jung bo sang e dae han yin sik kua tae do [Perceptions of and Attitudes toward Fair 
Compensation]." Pp. 209-250 in Han guk sa hoe ui pulp yong dung kwa hyong pyong [Inequality and Equity in Korean Society],, 
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A little agree Strongly agree 
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Figure 20. Support for various distributive criteria (the 1995 survey) 
 
 
Source: Son, Tae Won. 1997. "Ki up e seo ui bun bae gong jung sung kua jul cha gong jung sung [Distributive and Procedural 
Fairness at Work]." Pp. 239-272 in Han guk sa hoe ui pul pyong dung kwa kong jong song [Inequality and Justice in Korea], 








Strongly disagree A little disagree Neither disagree or 
agree 
A little agree Strongly agree 
Work experience (N=692) Educational attainments (N=688) 
Professional attainments (N=685) Task performance (N=688) 
Gender (N=688) Age (N=685) 
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Figure 21. People who lagged behind should blame themselves 
 
 
Source: Park, Jong min. 2005. "Han gook yin ui pyong dung ui sik [Korean's consciousness of equality]." Pp. 151-213 in Han 
guk sa hoe ui pul pyong dung kwa kong jong song ui sik ui pyonhwa [Perspectives on Inequality and Justice in Korean Society], 
edited by Hyon-ho Sok. Seoul Song gyun gwan Tae hak kyo Chul pan bu [University of Songgyungwan Press]   
*The 1995 survey of ‘Inequality and Justice in Korea’ by Sok et al. (2000) 










Strongly disagree A little disagree Neither disagree or 
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1995* Survey (N=1814) 2000** Survey (N=1800) 
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Figure 22. People become poor 
 
 
Source: Park, Jong min. 2005. "Han gook yin ui pyong dung ui sik [Korean's consciousness of equality]." Pp. 151-213 in Han 
guk sa hoe ui pul pyong dung kwa kong jong song ui sik ui pyonhwa [Perspectives on Inequality and Justice in Korean Society], 
edited by Hyon-ho Sok. Seoul Song gyun gwan Tae hak kyo Chul pan bu [University of Songgyungwan Press]   
*The 1995 survey of ‘Inequality and Justice in Korea’ by Sok et al. (2000) 
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Figure 23. Importance of reducing economic inequality of Korea and government’s responsibility for it (1995) 
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Figure 24. Korean society needs an economic reform for an equal distribution (2000) 
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Table 1. Changes in the income inequality of Korea from 1981 to 1997 
Year 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1996 1997 
Gini 
coefficient 
0.366 0.351 0.340 0.327 0.300 0.302 0.287 0.289 0.288 0.282 
p90/p10 4.79 4.59 4.38 4.14 3.89 3.87 3.63 3.75 3.75 3.77 
 
Source: Lew, Kyong joon. 1998. "Im kum sou duek bul pyong deng do ui bun hae wa won yin 
boon Sok [Decomposition and Analysis of Wage Income Inequality] " KDI chung check yeon 



















Table 2. Changes in the income inequality of Korea in the 1990s 





0.274 0.264 0.256 0.269 0.263 0.268 0.272 0.268 0.295 0.303 





0.266 0.256 0.248 0.263 0.257 0.262 0.264 0.262 0.287 0.294 
p80/p20 3.97 3.72 3.63 3.99 3.82 3.94 3.99 3.94 4.72 4.88 
 
Source: Data are collected from the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO). 
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Table 3. Comparison of income inequality measures between OECD countries 
 P90/P10 MLD GI ½SCV 
Simple OECD 
Average 


































































































































































Notes: In accordance with the ISSP survey year, the four income inequality measures for countries refer principally to the 
year 2000. However, the measures for Korea refer to the year 2003, since the ISSP survey for Korea was fielded in 2003.    
Source: Data for the fifteen OECD countries are reconstructed from Annex Figure A.3 in Förster, Michael and Marco Mira 
d'Ercole. 2005. "Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 1990s." OECD. Data for 
Korea are calculated from the 2003 Household Income Report by the Korean National Statistical Office.  
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Table 4. Standardized regression residuals for twenty OECD countries 
COUNTRY ZRE_GINI ZRE_½SCV ZRE_MLD ZRE_P90/P10 SUM_ZREs 
Denmark -1.568 -1.800 -1.678 -1.633 -6.678 
United States -1.455 -1.256 -1.376 -1.456 -5.543 
Japan -1.031 -0.941 -1.024 -1.107 -4.102 
Northern Ireland -0.964 -0.915 -0.924 -0.998 -3.800 
Canada -0.854 -0.840 -0.829 -0.802 -3.324 
Australia -0.842 -0.788 -0.826 -0.823 -3.279 
New Zealand -0.757 -0.626 -0.719 -0.666 -2.768 
Sweden -0.595 -0.782 -0.673 -0.597 -2.647 
Norway -0.539 -0.645 -0.609 -0.473 -2.265 
Germany -0.006 -0.060 -0.033 0.015 -0.083 
Great Britain 0.105 0.192 0.163 0.198 0.658 
Austria 0.718 0.575 0.761 0.687 2.741 
Poland 0.558 0.718 0.667 0.809 2.752 
France 0.750 0.673 0.729 0.782 2.933 
Spain 0.673 0.832 0.716 0.748 2.969 
Czech Rep 0.830 0.698 0.792 0.877 3.197 
Korea 1.147 1.177 1.050 0.435 3.808 
Hungary 1.184 1.168 1.195 1.263 4.811 
Portugal 1.217 1.401 1.326 1.309 5.253 
Slovakia 1.427 1.219 1.291 1.431 5.368 









Table 5. Mean values for E(Ji,chairman), E(Ji,unskilled), and E(Ji,G ) for countries 
COUNTRY 
 
E(Ji,chairman) E(Ji,unskilled) E(Ji,G ) 
Australia 
Mean .479 -.192 .672 
N 1310 1529 1284 
SD .506 .209 .569 
Germany 
Mean .338 -.160 .497 
N 913 1178 911 
SD .434 .209 .500 
Great Britain 
Mean .687 -.228 .922 
N 655 659 652 
SD .875 .339 .953 
Northern Ireland 
Mean .393 -.236 .636 
N 619 641 614 
SD .538 .259 .628 
United States 
Mean .528 -.255 .785 
N 974 985 949 
SD .793 .437 .915 
Austria 
Mean .307 -.176 .486 
N 840 906 839 
SD .439 .191 .510 
Hungary 
Mean .432 -.597 1.041 
N 829 1015 817 
SD .797 .364 .900 
Norway 
Mean .353 -.123 .476 
N 1147 1160 1146 
SD .629 .222 .674 
Sweden 
Mean .475 -.113 .588 
N 963 987 960 
SD .604 .227 .659 
Czech Rep 
Mean .406 -.306 .709 
N 1569 1676 1555 
SD .621 .351 .729 
Poland 
Mean .378 -.496 .871 
N 912 949 909 







Table 5 (cont.) 
COUNTRY 
 
E(Ji,chairman) E(Ji,unskilled) E(Ji,G ) 
New Zealand 
Mean .503 -.180 .682 
N 952 970 952 
SD .623 .260 .716 
Canada 
Mean .594 -.180 .775 
N 892 903 887 
SD .768 .451 .920 
Japan 
Mean .283 -.212 .488 
N 558 661 547 
SD .589 .382 .703 
Spain 
Mean .280 -.284 .567 
N 783 961 770 
SD .496 .495 .732 
France 
Mean .608 -.316 .920 
N 1591 1649 1528 
SD .689 .372 .811 
Portugal 
Mean .370 -.364 .736 
N 944 1018 940 
SD .594 .408 .712 
Slovakia 
Mean .192 -.577 .767 
N 1030 1059 1024 
SD .439 .531 .705 
Korea 
Mean .631 -.317 .939 
N 1132 1284 1130 
SD .983 .362 1.079 
Denmark 
Mean .296 -.145 .442 
N 1397 1507 1394 
SD .541 .266 .618 
Total 
Mean .431 -.273 .703 
N 20012 21696 19807 








Table 6. Multiple comparisons of the justice gap between Korea and other OECD 
countries via Dunnett’s C 
Country I Country J Mean Difference (I-J) SE 
Korea 
 
Australia .267* .036 
Germany .441* .036 
Great Britain .017 .049 
Northern Ireland .303* .041 
United States .154* .044 
Austria .452* .037 
Hungary -.103 .045 
Norway .462* .038 
Sweden .351* .039 
Czech Rep .230* .037 
Poland .067 .044 
New Zealand .257* .040 
Canada .167* .045 
Japan .451* .044 
Spain .372* .042 
France .019 .039 
Portugal .203* .040 
Slovakia .172* .039 










Table 7. Impact of the justice gap on the discrepancy between perceived and objective 
income inequality across countries 
 B (SE) 
Intercept -4.623 (3.73) 
E(Ji,G ) 19.023* (6.96) 


























Table 8. Comparisons of E(Ji,G ) between NTL and TL across countries  
Country 
 
E(Ji,G ) of NTL (I) E(Ji,G ) of TL (II) Difference (II-I) 
 
Mean .465 .764  
Australia N 382 876 .299* 
 
SD .526 .568  
 
Mean .246 .564  
Germany N 177 717 .319* 
 
SD .343 .516  
 
Mean .561 1.001  
Great Britain N 107 540 .440* 
 
SD .637 .984  
 
Mean .485 .713  
Northern Ireland N 178 412 .228* 
 
SD .550 .645  
 
Mean .606 .891  
United States N 315 607 .285* 
 
SD .815 .910  
 
Mean .272 .526  
Austria N 118 701 .254* 
 
SD .436 .515  
 
Mean .728 1.064  
Hungary N 56 761 .337* 
 
SD .753 .906  
 
Mean .250 .568  
Norway N 320 815 .318* 
 
SD .497 .715  
 
Mean .356 .684  
Sweden N 277 679 .328* 
 
SD .531 .684  
 
Mean .420 .751  
Czech Rep N 187 1363 .330* 
 





Table 8 (cont.) 
Country 
 
E(Ji,G ) of NTL (I) E(Ji,G ) of TL (II) Difference (II-I) 
 
Mean .490 .930  
Poland N 94 797 .440* 
 
SD .688 .923  
 
Mean .660 .691  
New Zealand N 251 673 .031 
 
SD .764 .705  
 
Mean .590 .853  
Canada N 256 621 .263* 
 
SD .962 .894  
 
Mean .373 .562  
Japan N 191 346 .190* 
 
SD .576 .750  
 
Mean .389 .592  
Spain N 72 694 .204* 
 
SD .679 .729  
 
Mean .438 .981  
France N 168 1355 .544* 
 
SD .711 .803  
 
Mean .065 .762  
Portugal N 34 904 .698* 
 
SD 1.111 .681  
 
Mean .680 .773  
Slovakia N 63 959 .094 
 
SD .728 .704  
 
Mean .737 .956  
Korea N 77 1050 .218* 
 
SD .838 1.094  
 
Mean .273 .556  
Denmark N 556 823 .283* 
 









MDJI EDJI MDJI-EDJI Correlations 
 
Mean 3.800 2.931 .870* 
 
Australia N 1626 1623 1622 .062* 
 
SD .575 .869 1.011 
 
 
Mean 3.695 3.616 .084* 
 
Germany N 1397 1389 1382 .061* 
 
SD .584 .846 .995 
 
 
Mean 3.804 3.254 .553* 
 
Great Britain N 810 799 799 .178* 
 
SD .628 1.018 1.098 
 
 
Mean 3.852 3.376 .483* 
 
Northern Ireland N 809 795 793 .105* 
 
SD .612 1.019 1.132 
 
 
Mean 3.911 3.396 .512* 
 
United States N 1200 1191 1183 .129* 
 
SD .646 1.047 1.156 
 
 
Mean 3.852 3.459 .395* 
 
Austria N 988 980 975 .155* 
 
SD .636 .917 1.034 
 
 
Mean 3.779 3.210 .571* 
 
Hungary N 1190 1188 1184 .137* 
 
SD .712 1.116 1.239 
 
 
Mean 3.636 3.204 .440* 
 
Norway N 1250 1243 1236 .033 
 
SD .640 1.040 1.201 
 
 
Mean 3.666 2.778 .896* 
 
Sweden N 1128 1119 1115 .074* 
 
SD .610 1.102 1.216 
 
 
Mean 3.787 3.145 .640* 
 
Czech Rep N 1821 1799 1798 .054* 
 
SD .692 1.032 1.212 
 
 
Mean 3.700 3.010 .702* 
 
Poland N 1084 1077 1064 .097* 
 
SD .736 1.143 1.297 
 
 
Mean 3.915 3.248 .670* 
 
New Zealand N 1085 1074 1073 .128* 
 






Table 9 (conts.) 
Country 
 
MDJI EDJI MDJI-EDJI Correlations 
 
Mean 3.777 3.242 .542* 
 
Canada N 966 966 962 .021 
 
SD .658 1.081 1.252 
 
 
Mean 3.452 3.133 .318* 
 
Japan N 1261 1235 1230 .130* 
 
SD .610 .934 1.045 
 
 
Mean 3.611 3.752 -.141* 
 
Spain N 1201 1200 1199 .381* 
 
SD .647 .775 .798 
 
 
Mean 3.760 3.580 .184* 
 
France N 1843 1833 1823 -.008 
 
SD .722 1.044 1.276 
 
 
Mean 3.999 3.154 .845* 
 
Portugal N 1127 1127 1123 .162* 
 
SD .655 1.143 1.223 
 
 
Mean 3.891 3.368 .521* 
 
Slovakia N 1078 1066 1066 .059* 
 
SD .660 1.070 1.223 
 
 
Mean 3.461 3.572 -.113* 
 
Korea N 1304 1307 1302 .242* 
 
SD .670 .921 .999 
 
 
Mean 3.650 2.650 1.001* 
 
Denmark N 1782 1758 1750 .037 
 
SD .687 1.034 1.218 
 
 
Mean 3.742 3.243 .501 
 
Total N 24949 24769 24679 .094** 
 











Table 10. Impacts of justice ideologies and socio-economic factors on Korean people’s 
perceptions of income differences (1=too large, 0=not too large) 
  Model I    Model II  
 B S.E. Exp(B)  B S.E. Exp(B) 
Justice Gap .177* .070 1.193  .161* .074 1.174 
EDJI .630* .112 1.877  .630* .118 1.878 
MDJI .075 .114 1.078  .083 .121 1.086 
Gender: Male 
(ref=female) 
.014 .159 1.014  .090 .167 1.094 
Occupational 
Hierarchy 
       
(ref=Bottom tier)        
Top tier .261 .230 1.298  .371 .246 1.450 
Second tier .124 .199 1.132  .207 .211 1.231 
Age groups 
(ref=70+) 
       
18-29 -.796** .446 .451  -.719 .483 .487 
30-39 -.306 .421 .736  -.234 .457 .791 
40-49 -.565 .413 .569  -.444 .449 .641 
50-59 -.368 .425 .692  -.283 .461 .753 





       
Bottom (the 
poorest) quintile 
-.008 .262 .992  -.242 .291 .785 
2
nd
 quintile .338 .287 1.403  .143 .307 1.153 
3
rd
 quintile -.124 .215 .883  -.191 .231 .826 
4
th











Table 10 (conts.) 
  Model I    Model II  
 B S.E. Exp(B)  B S.E. Exp(B) 
Education (ref= 
university complete) 
       
No degree -.140 .583 .869  -.131 .648 .877 
primary complete .122 .371 1.130  .077 .401 1.080 
incomplete secondary .378 .318 1.459  .259 .341 1.296 
secondary complete .386 .217 1.470  .289 .233 1.335 
incomplete university .093 .250 1.097  .000 .261 1.000 




       
Upward     -.395 .328 .674 




by  Degree of Mobility 
    -.571* .187 .565 
Justness Evaluation     -.430** .245 .651 
Current Social Status     -.212* .061 .809 
Χ2  68.785*    96.858*  
df  20    25  
N  787    787  
*p<.05, **p<.1 
 
 
